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Abstract 
Chinese universities are undergoing modernization reforms that aim to improve the rather 
bureaucratized management structure. The objective of this study is to examine how the 
power distribution within the universities is changing as a result of these reforms and how 
academics and administrators are involved in the establishment of new undergraduate 
programs. A multi-case study at two Chinese universities differing in their institutional 
prestige is utilized in addressing the research question. Data are collected through document 
analysis and qualitative interviews with key actors at different levels of the university, and 
analyzed using neo-institutional theory. The results show that at University X administrators 
maintained their influence in establishing new undergraduate programs at both faculty and 
institutional levels, while at University Y parts of authority has been transferred from 
administrators to academics. A comparison between the two universities reveals that the 
combination of the institutional autonomy and a prevailing logic of appropriateness among 
administrators can promote the institutionalization of authority redistribution between 
administrators and academics in the framework of the analyzed reforms. 
 IV 
 
Acknowledgement 
I would like to express my gratitude to everyone who supported me throughout the course of 
this master thesis. My sincerest gratitude goes to my supervisor, Jens Patrick Wilhelm 
Jungblut, whose illuminating guidance in the direction of the topic, timely response to the 
drafts of chapters and constant help makes it possible for the completion of this thesis.  
I would also like to thank all members in the Programme of Higher Education for the valuable 
input and help. I’m grateful to have studied at the University of Oslo. 
Furthermore, I would like to express my gratitude to my interview partners and professors 
who helped me to gain access to my interviewees. The assured access provided me significant 
support for collecting data that was needed for this study.  
Finally, my thanks goes to all of my family members, especially to my parents. I am grateful 
for their unconditional love and support, without which I would not be able to complete my 
thesis.  
 
Hong Zhong 
November 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 V 
 
Abbreviations 
CCP Chinese Communist Party 
CUP Classification of Undergraduate Programs in Regular Higher 
Education Institutions     
CCCPC Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 
CPC Communist Party Committee 
HEI Higher Education Institution 
MOE Ministry of Education 
NPM New Public Management 
TAO    Teaching Affairs Office 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 VI 
 
Table of Contents 
 
1 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1 
1.1 Research background and rationale ............................................................................. 1 
1.2 Research question ........................................................................................................ 3 
1.3 Thematic relevance of this thesis................................................................................. 4 
1.4 Thesis Outline .............................................................................................................. 5 
2 THEORETICAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK ................................................. 7 
2.1 Underlying themes of the study ................................................................................... 7 
2.1.1 University autonomy and academic freedom ....................................................... 7 
2.1.2 Authority in the University .................................................................................. 9 
2.2 Analytical framework ................................................................................................ 11 
2.2.1 Institutions, institutional change and the role of actors ...................................... 11 
2.2.2 Adaptation: indicators of change in power redistribution in the undergraduate 
program establishment ..................................................................................................... 14 
3 EMPIRICAL SETTING ................................................................................................... 18 
3.1 The Chinese higher education system ....................................................................... 18 
3.1.1 University governance in the pre-reform period (1949-1977) ........................... 18 
3.1.2 University governance from 1978 to 2010 ......................................................... 19 
3.1.3 Funding of higher education institutions in China ............................................. 24 
3.2 Implications for the power distribution in the introduction of undergraduate 
programs ............................................................................................................................... 25 
3.3 The cases .................................................................................................................... 27 
3.3.1 University X ....................................................................................................... 27 
3.3.2 University Y ....................................................................................................... 30 
4 METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................................... 32 
4.1 Research design and choices of cases ........................................................................ 32 
4.1.1 Ontological and epistemological considerations ................................................ 32 
4.1.2 Research design .................................................................................................. 33 
4.1.3 Rationales for the choice of cases ...................................................................... 34 
4.2 Sources of evidence ................................................................................................... 35 
4.2.1 Documents .......................................................................................................... 35 
4.2.2 Interviews ........................................................................................................... 36 
4.3 Validity and limitations of the study ......................................................................... 38 
4.3.1 Validity ............................................................................................................... 38 
4.3.2 Limitations of the study ...................................................................................... 40 
 VII 
 
5 FINDINGS ....................................................................................................................... 41 
5.1 Characterizing the Process of Undergraduate Program Establishment ..................... 41 
5.1.1 Program introduction procedure at the bachelor level in University X ............. 41 
5.1.2 Program introduction procedure at the bachelor level in University Y ............. 44 
5.2 Analyzing the Establishment of New Undergraduate Programs ............................... 47 
5.2.1 Analyzing the Establishment of New Undergraduate Programs in University X
 47 
5.2.2 Analyzing the Establishment of New Undergraduate Programs in University Y
 55 
5.3 Comparing the establishment procedures at University X and Y ............................. 60 
5.3.1 Degree of institutional autonomy ....................................................................... 60 
5.3.2 Logic of behavior ............................................................................................... 62 
6 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 64 
6.1 Research question and answer ................................................................................... 64 
6.2 Suggestions for future research ................................................................................. 67 
Reference .................................................................................................................................. 68 
Appendix .................................................................................................................................. 75 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 VIII 
 
Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Indicators for regulative pillar .................................................................................... 15 
Table 2: Indicators for normative pillar ................................................................................... 15 
Table 3: Indicators for cultural-cognitive pillar ....................................................................... 16 
Table 4 Composition of interviewees....................................................................................... 37 
Table 5 Approval process for new undergraduate programs in University X ......................... 44 
Table 6 Approval process for new undergraduate programs in University Y ......................... 46 
Table 7 Composition of Academic Committee at University X .............................................. 51 
Table 8 Composition of the Academic Committee at University Y ........................................ 58 
Table 9 Composition of the Teaching Committee at University Y.......................................... 58 
 
 
Figure 1 Pyramid of Chinese higher education institutions ..................................................... 21 
Figure 2 the internal governance structure of Chinese public universities .............................. 23 
Figure 3 the organizational and governance structure of University X ................................... 29 
Figure 4 the organizational and governance structure of University Y ................................... 31 
 
  
 1 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research background and rationale  
The provision of undergraduate programs of a university forms the disciplinary base that 
shapes its teaching and research (Clark, 1983). Given the special nature of teaching and 
research activities (Musselin, 2006), the establishment of new bachelor’s program requires 
substantial collegial participation in that the faculty hold the expertise required for the 
production of these activities. However, while the faculty is the primary actor in the 
establishment process, new actors within universities have been getting included in the 
decision-making process with the changing governance structure through university reforms.  
Various studies on higher education conclude that many far-reaching changes have been 
introduced in the governance of higher education systems and institutions around the globe 
(see e.g. Amaral, Meek, & Larsen, 2003; Christensen, 2011). These changes, derived from a 
belief that strategic organizational actorhood of more autonomous universities will be more 
efficient, more effective and more responsive in an increasingly complex and global 
environment (Krücken & Meier, 2006), attempts to address a growing imbalance between the 
demands on universities and their capacity to respond (Clark, 1998). Traditionally, 
universities were controlled by senior professors who were elected to manage for a limited 
period of time (Fumasoli, Gornitzka, & Maassen, 2014). This collegial model (Musselin, 
2006) becomes inefficient with growing expectations on universities that arisen from 
massification, internationalization and the role of the knowledge economy (Altbach, 2008; 
Olsen & Maassen, 2007; Trow, 1970). To increase institutional efficiency, decentralization 
reforms have been conducted to transform the relationship between the state, the university 
and academics (Christensen, 2011). This includes at the system level transferring parts of the 
decision-making authority vertically towards the universities (Amaral et al., 2003). At the 
institutional level, the role and position of leaders and managers have been strengthened and 
professionalized at the cost of the general involvement of the academic staff in institutional 
governance, leading to an emerging pattern of coexistence between institutional leadership, 
administrators and academics in the management structure within the university (Fumasoli et 
al., 2014). Empirical studies in other countries suggests that the power distribution between 
academics and institutional managers in introducing new academic programs varies across 
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institutions and systems (Locke, Cummings, & Fisher, 2011). So how is this phenomenon 
taking place at Chinese universities? 
In China, the establishment of new undergraduate programs was initially controlled by the 
government.  The primary mechanism for the government to introduce a new degree 
programs was the demand of labor forces for the national development in the central planned 
economy and labor market demand in the market-oriented economy (Yu, 2014). Both 
mechanisms for introducing new programs were instrumental.  Such an instrumental-oriented 
program establishment had a negative impact on the programmatic diversity of the Chinese 
higher education system, especially with regards to subject matters (interdisciplinary, 
professional vs. disciplinary-based, applied). One consequence of the state-controlled 
program establishment was the rise of two problems after the transition to mass higher 
education. The first is that graduates of Chinese universities were criticized of lacking 
innovation, practical abilities and social responsibility (Cai, 2011).The second is a lack of 
diversity among HEIs, all of which model themselves on comprehensive research universities 
with regard to the study programs offered (Zha, 2009). The isomorphism of HEIs reduced the 
system’s ability to serve the diverse needs of students, contributing to a rise of unemployment 
of university graduates (Cai, 2011). 
In response to these problems, a comprehensive reform proposal was presented in the Outline 
of China’s National Plan for Mid- and Long-term (2010-2020) Education Reforms and 
Development. One of the most important objectives elaborated in this modernization agenda 
is to build a strong national higher education system by further increasing institutional 
autonomy and academic capacity in academic governance. It is against this policy context that 
part of the decision-making authority in introducing new undergraduate degree programs was 
transferred to universities in 2012 with the promulgation of the Provisions on Opening and 
Readjusting Undergraduate Programs. The establishment of some undergraduate programs no 
longer requires the approval of the government. Instead, it requires joint decisions of 
institutional managers and academics through the Academic Committee. According to the 
MOE’s reports, more than 96% of new undergraduate programs were introduced without 
requiring government approval in 2013 and 2014.  
However, the increase of intuitional autonomy in introducing new bachelor’ programs does 
not assure a “healthy” program diversity in the Chinese context. Clark (1983) points out that 
anything approaching a monopoly of power becomes the greatest single danger in the 
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operation of a system of higher education. This is attested by the vicious cycle in higher 
education reforms whereby power delegation leads to disorder, which in turn leads to tighter 
control, thus ending the reform attempts. Between 1985-2009 the autonomy to establish new 
undergraduate programs was granted to HEIs several times, but each time it ended with the 
government stepping back in and retaking control due to a soaring number of new programs 
and a decrease in the quality of the programs (G. L. Zhou & Wu, 2009). One factor of this 
irrational increase is the administrator-dominated decision making. Chinese universities had 
been managed mainly by administrative power. The central administration had the executive 
power on all key university decisions (Xiong, 2009). Academics, though the principal 
workers in the university, had little say in final decisions and their roles were often impinged 
upon by administrators (Jiang & Wei, 2011). Therefore, the solution to the above mentioned 
two problems not only requires the delegation of power to the university, but also a re-
distribution of power within the university concerning the introduction of undergraduate 
programs, given that the professoriate is often described as a determinant force that shapes the 
quality and direction of higher education (Enders, 2006).  
Moreover, Chinese universities have been under an increasingly fierce public criticism from 
internal and external stakeholders for being more like a government unit than an academic 
institution. This criticism strengthens the need for increasing academic influence in university 
governance. As an academic institution, universities are normally characterized as a bottom-
heavy institution that is characterized by a strong influence of academic professionals on the 
determination of goals, the management of the institution, and the daily routines of work 
(Clark, 1983). Hence, the increase of academic power could be an important step to increase 
the legitimacy of Chinese universities. 
1.2 Research question 
Based on the above considerations, this thesis attempts to investigate how new programs are 
established within Chinese public universities that are concerned primarily with education as 
an end rather than as a means. In other words, this research mainly focuses on the research-
oriented public universities in Chinese universities, where there is a normative argument for 
the academic participation in the establishment of new undergraduate programs (Birnbaum, 
2004). Special focus will be given to the changing role of academics in the backdrop of 
modernization reforms that aim to improve academic participation in institutional governance. 
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Thus, the time frame of this thesis is focused on the past five years. Accordingly, the research 
question for this study is:  
How is the power distribution with regard to the introduction of undergraduate 
programs changing within Chinese universities against the backdrop of the latest 
university reforms? 
In order to answer the overall question, the following three sub-questions are raised: 
1. How has the formula of the intra-university authority distribution changed in the 
framework of recent policy reforms in China in relation to the establishment of new 
undergraduate programs? 
2. To what extent have these reform ideas been translated and implemented in practice? 
3. How is the de facto power distribution in approving new undergraduate programs 
changing and what are factors that influence the process of change? 
The first sub-question aims to examine policy changes that are relevant to the introduction of 
new bachelor’s programs before and after the reforms as well as the objectives of these 
reforms. The second sub-question takes the inquiry one step further by examining which 
changes have been taking place within the university in response to these policies, and how 
these changes impact the role of the Academic Committee, as the main professorial 
governance body within universities, in the establishment of new bachelor’s programs. The 
third sub-question tries to explore possible factors that affect the universities’ ability to 
implement and translate policies into de facto changes in the governance practices of the 
institution. 
1.3 Thematic relevance of this thesis 
This research is relevant for three reasons. First of all, university governance reforms that aim 
to increase academic participation in institutional governance are an important and long-term 
policy shift that has affected and will continue to affect institutional governance arrangements 
in Chinese universities.  By investigating how the authority redistribution within universities 
has been taking place in introducing new undergraduate degree programs, this research can 
catch a glimpse of the overall changing governance structure in Chinese universities. 
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Furthermore, the investigation of changes in governance within universities has received far 
less attention in the research literature than analyses of changes in the university-government 
relationship in China. 
Second, by investigating the power redistribution in core academic decisions in two 
universities that have different degrees of prestige in China, this research can be expected to 
provide insights into how the institutional prestige affects the outcomes of processes of 
governance reforms. This could contribute to the understanding of the impact of 
differentiation among Chinese universities on their responsiveness to national reforms.  
Third, the reform ideologies underpinning the decentralization policies in Chinese universities 
are in line with the ideas underlying the “global reform script” for universities (Christensen, 
Gornitzka, & Maassen, 2014). Since most of the empirical research on governance changes 
have been conducted in European countries or the United States, this empirical study on the 
outcomes of governance reforms in Chinese universities might provide a picture of university 
changes from an opposite starting point, and thus brings insights in higher education analysis 
on, for example, patterns and pathways of convergence/divergence in the global higher 
education era. 
1.4 Thesis Outline 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: 
Chapter 2 presents the theoretical and analytical framework. It first reviews the underlying 
themes that are relevant to the power distribution in the university, including university 
autonomy, academic freedom and authority distribution in the modern university. Based on 
these underlying themes, a neo-institutional approach is adopted to conceptualize and analyze 
not only the changes in formal legal terms, but more importantly, the de facto re-distribution 
of power within Chinese universities. 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the empirical setting of this study. A detailed description 
of the situation in university governance and management before 2010 is provided and 
changes in the national policies concerning the introduction of new bachelor’s programs are 
analyzed. This is followed by an introduction to the cases.  
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Chapter 4 explains the methodological approach in detail. The research design and choice of 
case are discussed. The validity and limitation of this research design are also discussed.  
Chapter 5 presents the analysis of the findings. First the current establishment procedures at 
the two universities are characterized in order to find out which actors are involved in the 
establishment process and what their roles in this process are. In the second stage of the 
analysis the establishment process is analyzed and discussed according to the regulative, 
normative and cultural-cognitive pillars of the institution to identify changes that have been 
taking place and their impact on the power distribution. 
Chapter 6 is the conclusion where the research question is answered, implications as well as 
limitations of the study are discussed, and suggestions for future research are made. 
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2 THEORETICAL AND ANALYTICAL 
FRAMEWORK  
This chapter presents the theoretical and analytical framework of the study. This is done in 
two sections. In the first section the themes of university autonomy, academic freedom and 
internal governance will be discussed. The aim is to introduce mechanisms concerning the 
distribution of authority inside the university, to gain a better understanding of the research 
topic. It also serves as a brief literature review, providing an overview of the state-of-the-art 
knowledge on higher education development. In the second section, an institutional 
framework on how to operationalize the research questions is provided. This includes the 
elaboration of the concepts of institution, institutional change, as well as the role of actors in 
the institutional work. 
2.1 Underlying themes of the study 
2.1.1 University autonomy and academic freedom 
Autonomy is seen as a necessity for universities to properly fulfill their functions and 
objectives. Traditionally, university autonomy was linked to academic freedom and academic 
self-government, which are the legacy of the Humboldtian University (Anonymity, 1970; 
Fumasoli et al., 2014). Academic freedom refers to the freedom of the individual scholar in 
his/her teaching and research to pursue truth wherever it seems to lead without fear of 
punishment for having violated some political, social or religious orthodoxy (Berdahl, 1990). 
Academic self-government is concerned with the collective control of academics in academic 
matters (Musselin, 2006).  
In earlier times, universities were committed to the advancement, validation and 
dissemination of knowledge for its own sake. They were protected by law and funded by the 
state in order to safeguard against any external intervention with the freedom of scientific 
inquiry (Ben-David, 1984). The protection of academic freedom and institutional autonomy 
and the guaranteed funding by the state enabled universities to establish normative and 
constitutive principles such as free inquiry and intellectual freedom, rationality, academic 
competence and expertise (Olsen, 2007). The societal valuation on objective knowledge has 
contributed to a stable relationship between university and society. This relationship can be 
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interpreted as a pact, which is “a fairly long-term cultural commitment to and from the 
University, as an institution with its own foundational rules of appropriate practices, causal 
and normative beliefs, and resources, yet validated by the political and social system in which 
the University is embedded” (Gornitzka, Maassen, Olsen, & Stensaker, 2007, p. 184). 
The relationship between university and society was relatively uncontested until the 
university started to grow, transiting from an “elite” to a “mass” system (Trow, 1970). In the 
mass higher education system, the goal of teaching function was no longer to train the 
bureaucracy for the nation-state (Castells, 2001). Instead, it is to provide the technical skills 
needed for a growing number of jobs that require sophisticated knowledge and educate people 
to think critically (Altbach, 2008). The research is also increasingly utilitarian oriented and 
linked to the needs of national economy (Maassen & Stensaker, 2011). These changing 
expectations on the university over the past three decades have transformed the relationship 
between the state and higher education institutions (HEI). This is echoed in the recent 
university reforms dominated by New Public Management (NPM) in many countries that aim 
to give universities more formal autonomy and to strengthen the actorhood of universities as 
organizations. However, the increased formal autonomy is always accompanied with 
increasing accountabilities in order to ensure the responsiveness of universities to the needs of 
the society (Christensen, 2011). The paradox of deregulation and regulation has gradually 
redefined institutional autonomy as a series of operational conditions and functions (Fumasoli 
et al., 2014). 
To discuss the increasingly complex relations between government and university with the 
ethical and philosophical axiom of university autonomy, Berdahl (1990) breaks down the 
issue of autonomy into two major parts. One is called substantive autonomy, which deals with 
the power of the university to determine its goals and programs such as what to teach and who 
to admit. The other is called procedural autonomy that concerns the power of the university to 
determine the means of pursuing its goals and programs, like finance and staff regulations. 
Governmental interventions in procedural matters are sometimes onerous and often counter-
productive to efficiency, but they do not prevent universities from ultimately achieving their 
goals, whereas actions that affect substantive issues, for example the establishment of new 
degree programs, affect the heart of the academe (Berdahl, 1990). 
The gradual redefinition of university autonomy has reshaped the distribution of authority 
within universities. Before turning to the changes in the distribution of authority, it is 
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worthwhile to first discuss the different forms of authority and the stakeholders they represent 
in the next section. 
2.1.2 Authority in the University  
The legitimate power has many forms in higher education systems. Clark (1983) categorizes 
them into three primary types according to where they are rooted: discipline, enterprise or 
whole systems. This thesis focuses on forms of authority that are rooted in disciplines and 
enterprises.  
Discipline-rooted/Academic Authority  
Discipline-rooted Authority is held by faculty members, and lodged mainly at departments 
and faculties. Clark (1983) identifies four forms of discipline-rooted authority: personal ruler 
ship, collegial ruler ship, guild authority and professional authority. The form that is relevant 
to this study is collegial authority. This is because in China the Academic Committee is the 
main agency that enables the faculty to participate in the decision making process of 
undergraduate program introduction. 
Collegial authority is distributed and balanced among a group of peers consisting of all or 
representative professors.  It is ideologically supported by the doctrine of academic freedom. 
Based on their professional expertise, these professors are entitled to exercise collective 
controlled over teaching and research matters in the department, faculty and university 
through the several-hour meetings (Clark, 1983). 
Bureaucratic/Administrative authority 
The form of enterprise-based authority concerned in this study is bureaucratic authority 
(Clark, 1983). This authority is lodged primarily at institutional level. It is formally delegated 
to hierarchical positions and offices in the university, such as the president, provost, deans 
and heads of the department, who coordinate with each other according to laws and rules. As 
their job-rewards and careers success depend directly on the apparent success of the 
university, values and interests of these administrators can be different from those of the 
faculty (Clark, 1983).  
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Authority distribution in the university 
Authority is allocated to different actors according to the governance of the university, i.e. the 
structures and processes through which participants interact with and influence each other 
(Birnbaum, 1991). Traditionally, universities were governed by senior professors with a 
symbolic leadership. According to Fumasoli et al. (2014), symbolic leadership consisted of 
selected professors who acted as university president, dean or department head for a limited 
period of time. They dealt with teaching and research matters through collective agreement, 
and with the assistance of an administrative support structure that was responsible for basic 
administrative tasks.  As such, the university governance was characterized by a high level of 
professional autonomy and a high level of faculty participation in the management. 
This balance of power between academics and administrators changed fundamentally by 
NPM-inspired reforms introduced in the late 1980s and 1990s in many countries (Fumasoli et 
al., 2014). The decentralization and regulation elements, which are based on a combination of 
new institutional economic theory and management theory, place greater emphasis on the 
formalization and responsibility concerning leadership alongside a stronger task specialization 
(Christensen & Lægreid, 2007; Larsen, Maassen, & Stensaker, 2009). As a consequence, the 
role of academics in university governance and management declined substantially (Amaral, 
Jones, & Karseth, 2002). The traditional substantive and procedural authority of academics 
over primary activities in the university was replaced by an executive structure comprised of 
increasingly professionalized managers and administrators (Fumasoli et al., 2014).  
Meanwhile, there are struggles trying to balance the increasing administrative power with 
processes of “shared governance” articulated in the 1996 Statement on Government of 
Universities and Colleges. This statement, which is jointly formulated by the Association of 
Governing Board of American Colleges and Universities, American Association of University 
Professors and American Council on Education, suggests that the faculty should have primary 
authority for such substantive areas as curriculum, subject matter and methods of instruction, 
research etc. Clark (1998) in his analysis of entrepreneurial university, while recognizing the 
importance of strengthening the steering core, also emphasizes the importance of reconciling 
new managerial values with traditional academic ones.  
Different emphasis on the ideological and practical basis for university governance and 
management has produced variance in the way in which administrative and academic 
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decision-making structures are organized (Larsen et al., 2009). In general there are two main 
types of governance structures in different European higher education systems: dual and 
unitary (Estermann & Nokkala, 2009). In the unitary structure, the academic authority and 
administrative authority is integrated. An individual actor or a single collective body holds the 
decision-making authority in relation to both administrative and academic matters. While in 
the dual structure, there is a separation between the two authorities. Actors and bodies 
excising administrative authority are responsible for administrative matters, and those 
represent the academic authority are in charge of academic decisions. The two decision-
making structures are parallel, with each either being equal or in a hierarchical position to one 
another (Larsen et al., 2009). 
After given some theoretical considerations on the issue of autonomy and authority 
distribution in the university, it is now time to adapt them to this study. Therefore, next 
section will present the analytical framework in order to measure and explain the outcomes of 
the case study. 
2.2 Analytical framework 
Taking the above considerations as point of departure, this study adopts a neo-institutional 
approach. The neo-institutional perspective on university change highlights the embeddedness 
of the university in the social and cultural contexts that affect micro-translation of individuals 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). Following the argument of Hall and Taylor (1996), this study 
combines different schools of new institutionalism to analyze why Chinese higher education 
institutions choose to decentralize the decision making in the university when there is a global 
pursuit of efficiency (Christensen et al., 2014) and how the existing national and institutional 
culture as well as individual actions would circumscribe the range of institutional creation of 
this new practice.  
2.2.1 Institutions, institutional change and the role of actors 
Institutions 
The analytical framework of this study is built based on an institution, which is conceived as 
“a relatively enduring collection of rules and organized practices, embedded in structures of 
meaning, and resources that are relatively invariant in the face of turnover of individuals and 
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changing external circumstance” (Olsen, 2009, p. 9). There are three central building blocks 
of an institution: regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements (Scott, 2013).  
 Regulative elements: The regulative elements of institutions are embodied in different 
written documents such as organizational charts, guidelines and rules. These 
regulations structure institutional behavior through the standardization and 
formalization of operating procedures. The behavioral mechanism is using incentives 
or coercion to make people follow rules. The institutional logic underlying this pillar 
is instrumentality. Rules are crafted and structures designed to channel the actions of 
decision-makers in certain directions in order to realize collective goals in the future.  
 Normative elements: The normative pillar of an institution includes both socially 
created values and norms. Such norms and values are often in forms of models and 
standards. They prescribe appropriate activities for particular individuals in specified 
positions. The central consideration for actors committed to the normative standard is: 
what is the appropriate behavior for them to carry out given their roles and within 
certain situation. Therefore, the empirical indicators of the existence of normative 
institutions are accreditations and certifications. 
 Cultural-cognitive elements: The third pillar of an institution emphasizes the shared 
definition of the nature and properties of roles and actions. The shared definitions are 
developed empirically through habituated and objectified behaviors. Hence 
institutionalized actions are replicated by latecomers because they are taken-for-
granted ways of doing things. The prevailing logic employed to justify compliance is 
orthodoxy. Each actor is motivated to comply with the shared norms because 
otherwise his/her actions cannot be understood by others in the system. 
The different elements of an institution can be combined in various forms to produce varying 
degree of social stability, as each of them provides a basis of legitimacy for stability. 
Legitimacy is defined by Suchman (as cited in Colyvas & Powell, 2006) as “a generalized 
perception or assumption that the actions of the entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate 
within some socially constructed systems of norms, values, beliefs and definitions.” Since 
these elements have different substantive focus, the bases of legitimacy they provide are 
different and may be in conflict. When cognitive, normative and regulative supports are well 
aligned, they can produce formidable strength in supporting the social order. Whereas 
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misalignment between them would lead to situations of confusion and conflict, providing 
conditions that are highly likely to give rise to institutional change (Scott, 2013). 
Institutional change and role of actors 
Institutional change is conceptualized as change in the existing regulative, normative and 
cultural-cognitive components of institution. It is a process of de-institutionalization of the 
existing practice and re-institutionalization of the new action (Scott, 2013). Such 
conceptualization emphasizes that institutional change needs to be examined not only in terms 
of the three pillars but also how changes in these pillars interact with each other in the 
process. The former is important for examining what has changed, while the latter 
investigates how much has been changed and how stable such change will be, i.e. the level of 
institutionalization of new practice, which will be elaborated with the attachment to our case 
later. 
As institutions are sustained, altered and extinguished through everyday activities of 
individuals, it is important to understand the role of individuals in institutional works. In new 
institutional theories individuals are not portrayed simply as “over-socialized cultural dopes” 
(Colyvas & Powell, 2006). They are also substantially empowered actors whose actions are 
based on the “logic of consequence” and “logic of appropriateness” (Christensen, Lægreid, 
Roness, & Røvik, 2007). Individuals act based on the former logic seek to maximize the 
degree of goal achievement, while those in line with the latter prefer actions that are 
considered appropriate in institutional contexts (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Meyer, 2008). As stated 
earlier, this study combines insights from different schools of neo-institutionalism, so it 
assumes there are varied combinations of the two logics guiding individual behavior in an 
actual situation, such as one logic operating alone, or the two work together, but with one 
assuming primacy. 
The operation of different (combination of) logic leads to different levels of 
institutionalization. In situations that logic of consequence prevails, actors will resist new 
practices if they will be worse off by making changes, even if these new practices provide 
better solutions and are compatible with existing institutions. It follows that when confronted 
within the same choice, actors with prevailing logic of appropriateness will actively work on 
the construction of institutions. However, what makes an action appropriate is a normative 
and institutional foundation based on past experience, which provides the filters for 
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individuals to interpret both the situation and themselves (Thelen, 1999). Hence, the 
understanding of appropriate action can be highly divergent in organizations that take 
different developmental trajectories. 
2.2.2 Adaptation: indicators of change in power redistribution in the 
undergraduate program establishment 
As stated earlier, the focus of this study is on the redistribution of authority in the introduction 
of undergraduate programs within the university. The authority distribution in the university 
concerns (1) the design of the formal organizational structure and rules of process used to get 
the task done and (2) the legitimate power of different actors. These different aspects of 
authority distribution can be seen as constituting institutions. On the one hand, the formal 
organizational structure and rules of processes, by defining roles not only determine who are 
involved in the decision-making process but also constrain their behaviors by restricting the 
scope of what they can do. On the other, the expertise of each actor and the special identity of 
the university discussed in the first section provide the normative and cultural-cognitive basis 
of legitimate power for different roles. Thus, the authority reallocation in this case can be 
conceptualized as institutional change.  
The effect of institutional change in this study focuses mainly on the process of 
institutionalizing the new formal and informal rules in relation to the establishment of new 
undergraduate programs provided by the national policy initiatives. This is because the old 
way of introducing programs will be automatically destabilized with the increasing 
institutionalization of the new practices in the university. However, the organizational 
arrangement of the old way can constrain actors, and thus impact the degree of the 
institutionalization of the new approaches. 
Institutionalization involves the development of the regulative, normative and cultural-
cognitive elements of the new approaches to introduce a new undergraduate program as well 
as strengthening the alignment between them. In this case of study, the regulative 
institutionalization of authority redistribution in opening new undergraduate programs 
includes the formalization and standardization of establishment procedures that reduce 
uncertainty and conflict concerning who does what, when and how. Formalization refers to 
the extent to which communications and procedures are written and filed, while 
standardization concerns the degree according to which certain procedures (e.g. decision-
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making, information provision) are repeatable after a given set of rules (Fumasoli et al., 
2014).  Special attention has to be given to the source of formalization, as it is assumed that 
the degree of formalization is increased with the increasing autonomy. Accordingly, empirical 
indicators of the development and province of regulative institutions are: changes in 
regulations concerning program establishment, and clarity on the allocation of formal 
authority among leadership level, administrative units and faculties.  
Table 1: Indicators for regulative pillar 
Adaptation of regulative element to authority 
distribution 
Indicators 
Regulatory processes involve the standardization and 
formalization of procedures of establishing new 
undergraduate degree programs 
 Change in regulations 
 Clarity on the allocation of formal 
authority 
 
Institutional work on the normative elements requires gaining legitimacy in relation to the 
norms and values from the social environments (Christensen et al., 2007). This concerns how 
behavioral rules are to be described, explained and justified, with a common vocabulary and 
success criteria (Olsen, 2009). Empirical indicators of the existence and pervasiveness of 
normative institutions in this study are: a) the socialized norms and values on the legitimate 
sources of authority in China in this dimension, and b) the common vocabulary related to 
authority distribution on the university regulations for academic decisions in general and 
undergraduate program establishment in particular. 
Table 2: Indicators for normative pillar  
Adaptation of normative element to authority 
distribution 
Indicators 
Normative institution concerns the university’s 
incorporation of socialized norms and values on who 
should participate in the decision-making process 
concerning the establishment of undergraduate 
programs i.e. the resonance between organizational 
and environmental norms and values. 
 Identify the common vocabulary of 
the university regulations on the 
authority distribution 
 Identify the socialized norms on the 
legitimate sources of authority in the 
decision-making process in this 
dimension 
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Institutional work on the cultural-cognitive aspects contains the increasing taken-for-
grantedness of these new approaches and boosting their cognitive legitimacy (Colyvas & 
Powell, 2006). Based on the situation in Chinese higher education, empirical indicators of the 
development and degree of the cultural-cognitive institutions are to be found in the 
composition and status of the Academic Committee, as well as the extent to which the new 
practice is taken-for-granted. The Academic Committee is expected to enable the faculty to 
exercise its right to participate in the decision-making process of introducing new 
undergraduate programs. If there are non-academic members, such composition of an 
academic decision-making body will raise an issue about whether and how decisions made 
within this body are influenced by the identity of its members. The answer to this question 
can help identify whose interests are emphasized and prioritized in the decision-making 
process, and thus infer underlying beliefs and assumptions on the appropriate way of authority 
distribution in the university. Attention will also be paid to the alignment of the new 
procedure with previous de facto routines in order to examine changes. 
Table 3: Indicators for cultural-cognitive pillar 
Adaptation of cultural-cognitive element to 
authority distribution 
Indicators 
Cultural-cognitive institutionalization implies an 
increasing shared understanding of the legitimate 
authority in the undergraduate program introduction and 
the taken-for-grantedness of these new approaches and 
boosting their cognitive legitimacy 
 The composition and status of 
Academic Committee 
 Previous de facto routines of 
decision-making in program 
introduction 
 
Institutionalization is a product of the coincident development of the above three elements. 
Given that the three processes do not march in the lock step with each other, 
institutionalization of the new practice does not necessarily proceed in a linear manner. There 
could be instances of “both thorough and extensive or incomplete and partial 
institutionalization” (Colyvas & Powell, 2006, p. 346). Thus, a distinction can be made 
between low, medium and high levels of institutionalization, depending on how the three 
elements are aligned with each other in the work of creating and maintaining institutions.  
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According to Colyvas and Powell (2006), the low level of institutionalization implies that the 
legitimacy of ‘new approaches’ is primarily social-political. Changes in regulations are made 
and a formal structure is created to include external vocabularies, but they are not yet 
internalized by those within the organization (normative and cognitive aspects). Hence, roles 
are ambiguous, and procedures are neither standardized nor formalized. New practices are 
usually not considered a viable threat to the existing practice. When the level of 
institutionalization is medium, procedures and structures are consolidated. The ambiguity of 
roles and values decreases, and there is a shift from social-political legitimacy towards 
cultural-cognitive legitimacy (Colyvas & Powell, 2006). At the middle stage new practices 
can prompt debates and oppositions due to the reaction from incumbents, leading to a failed 
or very limited institutionalization (Colyvas & Powell, 2006). When institutionalization is 
high, ‘new ways of doing things’ become sufficiently theorized and objectified, thus there is 
decreasing need for explanation and articulation (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996). 
The shift to cultural-cognitive legitimacy at the middle level of institutionalization brings 
forward the importance of belief systems in higher education. Clark (1983) identifies four 
basic types of academic belief: the culture of the discipline; the culture of individual 
university; the culture of the academic profession, as discussed in the first section; and the 
tradition of national higher education system. The belief systems involved in this study are the 
ones related to the academic profession and the individual university. The significance of 
institutional culture often becomes apparent in the institutionalization of new practices, 
particularly if the dominant institutional beliefs are threatened by these institutional works 
(Christensen et al., 2007), in this case the culture of academic profession. The professional 
beliefs are described primarily in normative standards, in relation to the norms and values the 
higher education field is expected to conform to: for substantive matters, the legitimacy for 
decision-making authority is provided primarily based on professional expertise (Clark, 1983; 
Mintzberg, 1983; Weick, 1976). 
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3 EMPIRICAL SETTING 
In this chapter the empirical context of this study is described in detail. First, an overview will 
be given of the Chinese higher education system to understand the environment in which the 
case universities operate. Main focus will be given to the governance and funding of Chinese 
higher education from a historical perspective. Here the political, economic and social reasons 
that shape this system will be discussed in order to help interpret findings correctly. The 
second section discusses the influence of governance and funding reform on the objectives 
and introduction procedures for new bachelor’s programs. In this section changes in the 
formal power distribution in relation to the undergraduate program introduction within and 
without the university will be examined. The final section gives an introduction to the case 
universities by providing information on profile, facts and figures and the organizational 
structure. Due to the anonymity requirement of the interviewees, the two universities are 
labeled as University X and University Y in the thesis. Most of the data and statistics are 
extracted from websites of MOE, universities and faculties. This thesis claims no liability for 
the data, as the only purpose is to reveal an overall trend. 
3.1 The Chinese higher education system 
Since the economic transformation from central-planned to market economy and the open-
door policy started in 1978, China has adopted ideas and strategies along the line of neo-
liberalism not only in economic reforms but also in the public sector restructuring 
(Christensen, Dong, & Painter, 2008; Mok & Lo, 2007). This also includes higher education 
sector, where the governance mode has undergone fundamental changes. In order to 
understand the current situation, it is necessary to take a look at the university governance in 
the period from 1949 to the late of 1970s before proceeding to the contemporary university 
governance at both national and institutional levels. Therefore, the next section will give a 
brief introduction to the pre-reform higher education governance in China. 
3.1.1 University governance in the pre-reform period (1949-1977) 
When the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came into power and established the People’s 
Republic of China in 1949, the state adopted the Soviet Union’s model characterized by 
centralism to restructure the entire higher education system and transform the social, political 
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and economic system (Cai, 2011). In this centralized model the university was a subsidiary of 
the government. The central government assumed full responsibility for higher education 
policy formulation, resources allocation, intra-university management, student admission, 
study programs, curriculum and job assignment on graduates (X. P. Li, 2000). The aim of this 
complete restructuring of the entire higher education system was to place HEIs at the 
immediate service for national economic objectives (Liu & Shi, 2010). In order to achieve 
these objectives, the government required the HEI to model their internal governance 
structure after its bureaucratic control mode. As a consequence, the faculty level management 
was abolished. Instead, tangled and unwieldy administrative offices were established and 
became the loci of both administrative and academic decisions (Qi & Chen, 2000). 
Administrative officials and heads of department were appointed with a civil servant rank 
(Hao & Zhou, 2012). 
The bureaucratic governance structure at both the system and institutional levels was 
strengthened during the period of political turmoil. The consolidated bureaucratic control 
completely denied the special identity of the university as an academic institution (Hao & 
Zhou, 2012). As a consequence, the university was understood mainly as a tool for national 
objectives. This phenomenon was later termed as ‘bureaucratization’ in China. The notion of 
bureaucratization in the Chinese university governance places an emphasis on the 
officialdom-orientation in the belief system of the university staff and the will of the 
administrators (Rothstein, 2015; Sun, 2006). At the system level, it refers to the heavy-handed 
governmental interference into the university affairs; at the institutional level, it denotes the 
questionable intervention of administrative authority into academic affairs through recourse 
allocation (Hao & Zhou, 2012). 
3.1.2 University governance from 1978 to 2010 
Governance change at the national level 
When the country was recovered from turbulence in the political environment, the opening-up 
reform has transformed the centrally planning economy and set China on a more rational, 
market-oriented economy path to modernization (Mok & Lo, 2007). One of its primary tasks 
was to rebuild a higher education system suitable for economic development (Wang, 2010). It 
is in this new market-economy context that centrally controlled governance in the higher 
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education system was increasingly criticized and university autonomy began to elicit attention 
(Cai, 2011). In 1985 the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCCPC) 
issued the Decision on the Reform of the Educational System (hereafter referred to as 1985 
Decision), which marked the beginning of continuous governance reforms that aligned the 
higher education system with the newly emerging market economy (Mok & Lo, 2007). The 
1985 Decision acknowledged that university autonomy was a priority. HEIs were delegated a 
certain degree of discretionary authority in dimensions such as personnel management as well 
as academic and financial decisions (CCCPC, 1985). Special attention needs to be given to 
the stipulation that “individual HEI may be given different autonomous rights in different 
situations” (CCCPC, 1985). Under this regulation, it became possible to differentiate HEIs in 
terms of the level of governmental control.   
Following this guideline, a series of policies have been successively issued to further increase 
university autonomy. For example, the Program for Educational Reform and Development in 
China, which is jointly issued by CCCPC and the State Council in 1993, specified in Article 
18 that university governance should be partly devolved from the central to the provincial 
governments. Today, at the level of central government, 73 regular1 HEIs are administered by 
the Ministry of Education (MOE), and 40 by other ministries (MOE Statistics 2013). Among 
the 73 HEIs affiliated to the MOE, 39 are listed in “Project 985”, and 31 are in “Project 211”. 
There are 81 more “Project 211” universities, most of which are administered by other 
ministries. The two projects are governmental attempts to improve the quality of teaching and 
research in higher education. The “Project 985” is a construction project launched in 1998 
with an aim to build a few world-class universities. “Project 211” started in 1993 and is the 
government’s endeavor to strengthen about 100 HEIs as a national priority for the 21st 
century. At the provincial level, 1661 regular HEIs are under the direct administration of 
governments of provinces, autonomous regions or municipalities (MOE Statistics 2013).  
The establishment of “Project 211” and “Project 985” has differentiated Chinese HEIs 
vertically in terms of quality. According to the functions of academic features, HEIs can be 
classified into four types: research institutions, teaching and research institutions, teaching 
institutions and application oriented institutions. Based on the national priority of higher 
education development, Chinese HEIs are divided vertically into four layers, as shown in 
Figure 1. The first layer includes 39 project 985 universities that are considered as research 
                                                 
1 The term “regular” is used to distinguish these institutions from adult higher education institutions. 
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universities in China. The remaining 73 project 211 universities are oriented towards both 
teaching and research and locate in the second layer. In the third layer there are about 668 
teaching HEIs (mainly provincial). The last layer comprises of 993 higher vocational colleges. 
 
Figure 1 Pyramid of Chinese higher education institutions 
Source: Cai, (2011). 
This pyramid can also be used to illustrate the autonomy of HEIs. According to the 1985 
Decisions, HEIs can be given different degree of autonomy based on their negotiation ability, 
i.e. the performance of the HEI. The stronger the university is, the more autonomy they have 
(Lin, 2012). Meanwhile, government leaders wholeheartedly support project 985 and 211 
universities, as they are seen as a way not only to rejuvenate the nation but also to assert its 
soft power in the global world (Mok & Ong, 2014; Postiglione, 2014). Thereby, these 
universities could enjoy more informal autonomy than lower level HEIs. 
The university autonomy was legalized by the Higher Education Law promulgated in 1998. 
Under this law, Chinese HEIs are legally recognized from their establishment, and shall have 
the autonomy in matters relating to teaching, research, program development, personnel 
management, resource allocation and international cooperation. The implementation of 
decentralization policies has resulted in a shift in university governance model from a state 
controlled model to a state supervised model (van Vught, 1988). According to a survey on 
institutional autonomy conducted in 2010, more than half of the respondents (55%) 
considered their institutions now enjoy much greater autonomy in teaching, research, 
personnel management and organizational structures (Zhang & Liu, 2012). Nevertheless, 
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despite that the 1998 law initiated reforms of de-bureaucratization 2  in the university 
governance (Hao & Zhou, 2012), the influence of path dependency was prominent. The 
heavy-handed state invention was relatively common in the university’s personnel 
management, resource supply and program development, according to a survey on the 
bureaucratization in university governance (National Academy of Education Administration, 
2012).  
In 2010 a comprehensive reform proposal to modernize Chinese higher education was 
elaborated in the Outline of China’s National Plan for Mid- and Long-term (2010-2020) 
Education Reform and Development.  These reform proposals targeting on problems of 
bureaucratization in university governance, aim to build a modern higher education system 
with Chinese characteristics, in which universities are “run according to law, under 
autonomous governance and democratic supervision, and with public participation” 
(Government of China, 2010). This move, trying to enhance the performance and social 
legitimacy of Chinese universities, has significant potential to allow more room to maneuver 
for public HEIs. 
Governance change at institutional level 
The 1985 Decision indicates that the government plan to withdraw power from higher 
education institutions (HEIs) and to give more responsibility to the university president. 
However, the retreat was hobbled by the Tiananmen Square Affair in 1989 (Cai, 2011). 
Henceforth, a new responsibility system was introduced in 1990 to put university presidents 
under the leadership of the Communist Party Committee (Wang, 2010). This new presidential 
responsibility system was written into the Higher Education Law, which formed a higher 
education system with Chinese characteristics. The Communist Party Committee (CPC) acts 
as the governing board. According to Article 39 of the Higher Education Law, it excises 
unified leadership over university affairs, supports the president in fulfilling his 
responsibilities, and ensures the socialist orientation of the university by taking 
responsibilities of political education of administrators, academics and students. The president 
is the legal representative of the university and undertakes the over-all responsibility for 
teaching, research and administrative issues under the supervision of the CPC. This dual 
                                                 
2 The de-bureaucratization refers to the elimination of inappropriate and illegitimate bureaucratic administration 
(National Academy of Education Administration, 2012). 
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leadership consists of a unique internal governance structure of all Chinese public HEIs, as 
illustrated in Figure 2. There are two heads of university leaders, the president and the party 
secretary. The fact that both of them have decision-making authority results in ambiguity in 
the decision-making locus at most Chinese HEIs. There have been reported cases of conflicts 
between them, despite that a joint administrative-party committee is set up to ensure their 
communication and collaboration (M. Li & Yang, 2014). The organization of the faculty and 
departmental governance follows the same dual leadership structure. Leaders at the top level 
(party secretary, deputy secretaries, president, vice presidents) are appointed by affiliated 
party-state.  
 
Figure 2 the internal governance structure of Chinese public universities  
Source: (Jiang & Wei, 2011) 
The Higher Education Law has also required the establishment of an academic committee 
dealing with academic matters, and a degree committee that decides the degree awarding and 
the requirements for being a supervisor. All public HEIs have established these two 
committees by 2005, and some have established other academic agencies such as teaching 
committee, staff promotion and evaluation committee, etc. (M. Li & Yang, 2014). However, 
functions of these academic agencies are not clear, and their relationship (parallel or 
hierarchical) varies across university to university. The ambiguity in the role of and 
relationship between academic agencies inevitably leads to restricted influence in the 
university governance. Moreover, these committees are composed of administrative officials 
(Ai, 2012; Shen, 2000), in which case, there was little difference between academic meetings 
and administrative meetings (Luo, 2014). Consequently, the power distribution between 
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academics and administrators changed little, and the increased institutional autonomy had in 
essence been integrated into the executive structure. 
3.1.3 Funding of higher education institutions in China 
With the management of most higher education institutions decentralized from the central to 
the local governments, the responsibility of financing them was also shifted from the former 
to the latter (CCCPC, 1993). Thereafter, the public universities have been funded mainly by 
the government to which they are affiliated. After the implementation of the expansion 
enrollment policy in 1999, the gross enrollment ratio has increased from 9.8% in 1999 to 
34.5% in 2013, with the total number of student increasing by more than 30 million (MOE 
Statistics, 2014). In order to address the rapid expansion of student enrollment and provide 
sufficient financial resources, the government transformed the single funding channel 
dependent only on the government into a cost-sharing system with government appropriation 
as the principal source and private supports and other resources as supplementary sources. 
The allocation mechanism of the public funding system is a combination of student-based 
funding and performance-based funding. The latter includes earmarked funding for research 
and for special projects like “Project 211” and “Project 985” (Wang, 2008). The private 
funding sources include tuition and other fees, social donations and commercialization (Cai, 
2011). Today, tuition and other fees are the second most important source of university 
income, soaring from 15.1% of the total income in 1996 to 31.5% in 2005 (Wang & Mok, 
2014).  
The allocation of public funding is unequal. For one thing, there is a big gap in the fund 
allocation for institutions affiliated with the central and provincial governments. The 
provincial governments are under greater financial burden, as they are responsible for all 
institutions located in their respective jurisdiction except for a few that are funded by the 
central government. This results in a big discrepancy in the funding allocated to the two types 
of institutions. Take the per-student expenditure in 2011 as an example. In 2011, the average 
public budget for per-unit cost in the universities subordinated to the local government was 
11,980 Yuan, while that in the universities affiliated with the MOE was 25,427 Yuan (China 
Educational Finance Statistical Yearbook, 2012). Additionally, the distribution of 
performance-based funds is also unbalanced among universities under the management of the 
same government. The funds are centered on prestigious universities (Wang, 2008). For 
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example, between 2009 and 2013, the fund for project 985 and project 211 universities took 
up over 70% of the total research funding (XinhuaNet., 2014). In short, the inequity has led to 
a positive correlated relationship between the type of the HEI and the amount of fund it 
receives. The higher the HEI ranks in the pyramid of Chinese HEIs, the more funds it receives 
from the government.  
The change in the funding mechanism of higher education system can have a direct influence 
on the behavior of HEIs (Preffer & Salancik, 1978). Despite the diversification of funding 
sources, HEIs in the lower level still rely heavily on public funds. Given that public funds are 
centered on the top-level universities, lower level HEIs are keen to upgrade their levels by 
following the model of research universities which usually offer a comprehensive range of 
degree programs. This in turn leads to a convergence upon a single organizational form 
(Hölttä & Cai, 2012).  
3.2 Implications for the power distribution in the 
introduction of undergraduate programs 
In the central-planed era, the establishment of new undergraduate programs was fully 
controlled by the government. With the degree of the overall university autonomy increasing 
and public funding decreasing after 1985, there has been a growing demand for autonomy in 
opening new undergraduate programs from inside the universities. This autonomy was 
granted to HEIs in 1998 with the promulgation of Higher Education Law. It is specified in 
Article 33 that HEIs are able to take their initiative in offering and readjusting fields of study 
and sub-disciplines. Higher Education Law also stipulates the institutional decision-making 
structure for approving new degree programs. According to Article 42, an academic 
committee shall be set up for deliberation.  However, these regulations were not fully 
incorporated into Provisions on Opening and Readjusting Undergraduate Programs issued in 
1999 (hereafter referred to as Provisions). Provisions is the particular regulation that regulates 
the establishment of new undergraduate programs. According to Provisions 1999, the 
discretionary power was still vested in the government. The introduction of new 
undergraduate degree programs required approval by the government, and sometimes the 
government would demand public HEIs to open a program closely articulated with the 
national or local development plans and strategies (Wang, 2010). The government also 
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controlled the total number of new undergraduate programs to be established in HEIs under 
its jurisdiction. The maximum number of new program one HEI can open in one year is three.  
The role of academic committee was also understated in Provisions 1999, which stipulates 
that the Academic Committee should be called upon to pingyi the proposed undergraduate 
programs. According the Xinhua Dictionary (Chinese), pingyi means to comment through 
discussion. Academic committee with such role is not considered as a legal decision-maker, 
and it may or may not be consulted with in the decision-making process.  According to a 
survey on bureaucratization, the faculty involvement in the decision-making process of 
program introduction was very limited (National Academy of Education Administration, 
2012). In some HEIs the decision on the introduction of new study programs at bachelor level 
was made either by the vice president in charge of teaching affairs or director of Teaching 
Affairs Office without consulting or informing faculties. 
In line with the principles of the Outline of China’s National Plan for Mid- and Long-term 
(2010-2020) Education Reform and Development for modernizing Chinese higher education 
system, the discretionary power was granted to all HEIs with the revision of Provisions in 
2012, allowing them to make their own decisions on introducing the first two types of new 
undergraduate programs included in Classification of Undergraduate Programs in Regular 
Higher Education Institutions (CUP). CUP is a list of instructional programs at Chinese HEIs. 
It was initially compiled by MOE in 1954 according to national division of labor (G. L. Zhou 
& Wu, 2009). Substantial revision and update was made in 1987, 1993, 1998, and 2012. The 
basis for classifying study programs has been shifting from the occupational classification to 
disciplines, and thus the number of programs has been reduced from over 1,300 to 502.  
Moreover, CUP 2012 divides instructional programs into three categories. The first category 
is foundation programs. The second category is specialized programs that are intended to 
meet the needs of national development. The third category is government controlled and 
distributed programs, for example, programs in security and medicine. 
Now Chinese HEIs can autonomously introduce the first two types of undergraduate 
programs listed in CUP 2012. They no longer have to obtain approval of the government on 
the introduction of a new undergraduate program. Instead, they just need to get the approval 
of the program committee or academic committee at the institutional level, and publish their 
decisions online for one month. This step is added to improve transparency of the 
establishment. Then HEIs will send the documentation to the affiliated government for 
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verification. The purpose of government verification is to make sure that the information, 
such as the size of the faculty and facilities, provided by the HEI is true. If there is no fake 
information, the government will submit the documentation to MOE for filing. However, the 
introduction of the third type of programs or programs outside the CUP 2012 remains to be 
approved by the government. The power shift is accompanied with the changing role of the 
Academic Committee. Provisions 2012 stipulates that the role of the Academic Committee in 
the review process is shenyi. Shenyi means to approve or reject through deliberation. 
Academic Committee with the role of shenyi undergraduate program introduction is 
considered as a compulsory decision-maker. In other words, decisions on which new 
undergraduate programs to be introduced should be made jointly by the Academic Committee 
and the president. 
In summary there is a shift of decision-making authority in the establishment of new 
undergraduate programs towards the faculty in reform policies. The influence of a small 
group of officials is reduced in favor of the Academic Committee. But how have these formal 
changes been implemented within Chinese universities? How do they affect the power 
distribution in undergraduate program introduction, especially in interaction with the 
consolidated administrative authority? In order to examine actual changes, the empirical 
settings where changes are taking place need be introduced first. Therefore, in the next section 
a brief introduction to the cases is given in order to get an understanding of how the cases 
look like before moving to the elaboration on the methodology used to examine changes.  
3.3 The cases 
3.3.1 University X 
University profile 
University X was founded in 1950. It was specialized in information technology, and 
provided service for both military (1950-1978) and the society. In 2000, under the governance 
reform in China, the university became governed and financed by the provincial government. 
Since 2006 the university, with its excellence in information science and technology, has 
gained financial support from the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of China. 
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There was also a shift from the sole jurisdiction by the provincial government to joint 
jurisdiction between the central and local governments. 
University X has grown into a comprehensive university which focuses on teaching and 
research. It plans to build itself into a teaching and research institution that not only plays a 
significant role in the domain of information and telecommunication, but also develops in the 
fields of engineering, science, management, and liberal arts. 
Facts and figures 
By 2014 the university has over 24,000 students, including more than 3,000 postgraduates. It 
has more than 1,600 academic staff, among which over 180 are professors, and around 400 
are associated professors. There are 20 fellows who are honorary or part-time professors from 
the China Academy of Science and China Engineering Academy, in addition to 100 
prominent overseas scholars as visiting professors. The University has 15 faculties, offering 
47 undergraduate degree programs, 50 master’s degree programs and 2 PhD programs. 
The organizational and governance structure of University X 
The Higher Education Law stipulates horizontal diffusion of power within universities, but it 
does not specify the internal structure of HEIs. This allows HEIs to decide their own 
organizational and management structure. The main governance process of the university X is 
presented in Figure 3. There are 9 university leaders: the party secretary who is the chairman 
of the standing committee of CCP, the president who is also the vise chairman of that 
standing committee, one deputy secretary, five vice presidents and one chair of Discipline 
Inspection Committee of CCP. The standing committee of CCP is the core policy-making 
agency at the university. It decides on the university reform and development, and appoints 
the intermediate leadership. Members of the standing committee include 8 university leaders 
who are all party members. Major decisions on academic and administrative matters are made 
by the Council of Presidents whose membership comprises all university leaders. In addition, 
there are three parallel standing academic units dealing with academic matters. The Degree 
Committee reviews and takes final action on the awarding of degrees. The Teaching 
Committee is responsible for evaluating and advising teaching activities in order to improve 
teaching and learning on campus. Both of the two standing committees are subordinated to 
the Teaching Affairs Office (TAO). In Chinese HEIs, TAO is responsible for all matters 
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pertaining to undergraduate education. The Academic Committee is subordinated to the 
Office of Science and Technology and has duties to review all matters relating to program 
development including establishment, modification and withdrawal, and make 
recommendations on policies regarding academic planning and professional recruitment. 
 
Figure 3 the organizational and governance structure of University X 
Source: Based on the author’s analysis of university regulations 
Profile of Faculty A 
The faculty was established in 2001 and offers only one bachelor’s degree program of liberal 
arts. In 2013 the faculty introduced another undergraduate degree program, and in 2014 it 
established a Master’s degree program. As of September 2014, the faculty has 85 academic 
staff, among which there are 7 professors and 28 associate professors. As a teaching faculty, 
the major source of funding is the government allocation based on the enrollment numbers. 
The faculty is led by one party secretary, one deputy party secretary, and three vice deans, 
who are members of the Faculty Joint Committee. There are three subdivisions of institutional 
academic units in the faculty: Academic Committee, Degree Committee and Teaching 
Committee. 
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3.3.2 University Y 
University Profile 
University Y was established as a national polytechnic institution in 1953 in a reorganization 
that brought about Engineering Departments from five universities located in the same region. 
When the University was recovered from Cultural Revolution, it began to provide programs 
in selected areas of humanities and social sciences, and to integrate research with teaching. In 
2000 it merged with three other institutions so as to be eligible to join “985 Project”.  Now it 
has developed into a prestigious comprehensive university directly under the administration 
of MOE in China. One mission of the University is to build itself into a world-renowned 
research university. 
Facts and figures 
As of April 2015, the University offers a variety of degree programs in 12 disciplines, 
including 94 bachelor’s degree programs, 225 master’s degree programs, 184 PhD programs, 
and 39 post-doctoral programs. More than 3,000 faculty members instruct 32,863 
undergraduate students, 22,775 graduate students (including PhD candidates) and 1,629 
international students under the support of more than 3500 administrative staff. 
Organizational and management structures of University Y 
The Charter of University Y prescribes its main governance processes. The standing 
committee of CCP is the highest decision-making agency at the university. The committee is 
made up of twelve elected members: ten university leaders (the party secretary, the president, 
one executive vice president, three deputy secretaries, three vice presidents, and one chief 
accountant) and two senior professors. In terms of the academic and administrative affairs, the 
main decision-making body is the president with the assistance of the Council of Presidents 
and the Academic Committee. The Council comprises 15 members including all university 
leaders and five directors of administrative units. The Academic Committee is the supreme 
academic body at the university. It has a set of standing committees dealing with different 
academic matters. The Degree Committee shares the same duties with that of University X, 
while the Teaching Committee has authorities to deliberate all matters relating to 
undergraduate teaching including program development, evaluation, and curricula 
development. Figure 4 presents the organizational and governance structure of University Y. 
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Figure 4 the organizational and governance structure of University Y 
Source: Based on the author’s analysis of university regulations 
Profile of Faculty B 
The case faculty has 3 departments, an experiential teaching center and 7 research institutes. 
The faculty offers 3 PhD programs, 10 master’s degree programs, and 4 bachelor’s degree 
programs including the one introduced in 2014. There are 110 faculty members, among which 
78 are full-time. Now it has a total enrolment of approximately 700 undergraduates and 300 
graduates. Being research oriented, the faculty receives about RMB 10 million research funds 
per year. Furthermore, the faculty has established long-term cooperation with many 
international universities and industry. 
The organizational and governance structure of the faculty follows that of the University. The 
Faculty Executive Committee is made up of one dean, three vice deans, one party secretary 
and one deputy party secretary. The faculty has established three subdivisions of academic 
agencies: the Academic Committee, Teaching Committee, and Degree Committee, as 
required by the Bylaw of Academic Committee. It also has a Professor Committee consisted 
of all professors of the faculty. The committees involved in the program establishment 
process at this faculty are the Professor Committee and the Teaching Committee.  
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4 METHODOLOGY  
This chapter describes the plan of inquiry applied in this study. A case study approach has 
been used to investigate how the power distribution is changing in terms of the program 
introduction at the bachelor level and why it is changing in this way. The rationale for 
choosing this research design is provided through a brief discussion on the ontological and 
epistemological considerations. This is followed by the description of data collection tools 
and sampling procedures. This chapter closes with the evaluation of the research design and 
discussion of its limitations.  
4.1 Research design and choices of cases  
All research is based on some underlying ontological and epistemological considerations 
about what constitutes valid research and which research methods are appropriate (Creswell, 
2009; Furlong & Marsh, 2010; Kleven, 2008). In order to conduct and evaluate this research, 
it is therefore important to discuss briefly the philosophical assumptions underpinning this 
study before an elaboration on the methodological approach is provided. 
4.1.1 Ontological and epistemological considerations 
The philosophical assumption underlying this study is critical realism. According to Maxwell 
(2012), such position combines ontological realism with epistemological constructivism. The 
ontological realist element of this position assumes that social phenomena exist independently 
of our interpretation and construction of them, while the epistemological constructivist 
element of the position acknowledges that since not all social phenomena are directly 
observable, all knowledge about them is partial, incomplete and fallible, grounded in our own 
perspective and worldview (Furlong & Marsh, 2010; Maxwell, 2012). 
This has important implications for the theoretical and methodological considerations of this 
study. A critical realist position agrees that there are different valid perspectives on the 
understanding of the world. It argues for the legitimacy of causal explanation in explaining 
the interaction of the many elements and processes implicated in a given event (Maxwell, 
2012; Sayer, 2000). This implies that a specific outcome is the resultant of many factors 
operating in their actual context, including the metal events and processes that can be the 
cause of behavior. Therefore, the explanation of how and why power distribution is changing 
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in this thesis unpacks this process into three elements (see chapter 2) and examines both their 
individual and combined effects in the Chinese context.  
4.1.2 Research design 
Given the above ontological and epistemological considerations, this study adopted a research 
design of a qualitative case study. According to Yin (2014), “a case study is an empirical 
inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, 
especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident” 
(p. 16).  The twofold definition shows that a case study is not merely a data collection method 
but comprises an all-encompassing method that is comfortable with using both quantitative 
and qualitative research methods. Bryman (2012) makes a distinction between the two 
methods according to whether the emphasis is on the number or words during the collection 
and analysis of data. This study is qualitative in terms of the type of data and methods of 
analysis it uses. The data were collected through public document and semi-structured 
interviews, afterwards they were analyzed based on thick description.  
This study chooses a case study because it is suitable if the research interest is in process of 
monitoring or causal explanation (Merriam, 1998). According to Yin (2014), a case study 
should be considered when: a) the focus of the study is to answer “how” and “why” questions; 
b) the investigator has no control over events; or c) the contextual conditions are believed to 
be relevant to the phenomenon under study. This study is interested in exploring how the 
intra-university decision-making structure is changing with regards to program introduction at 
the bachelor level after the issue of policies such as Outline 2010 and Provisions 2012. In 
order to discover the extent to which the policy is implemented, the national and institutional 
settings has to be described, which affect the process of institutionalization of the new 
practice. Therefore, a case study was selected for addressing the research problem. 
 A case study can be conducted using one or more than one cases (Yin, 2014). This study 
wants to investigate the institutionalization process of the new program introduction practice 
in different universities, because the evidence generated from multiple cases selected from a 
heterogeneous population would be more compelling (Merriam, 1998; Yin, 2014). It can be 
seen from Chapter 3 that Chinese universities are highly diversified. Though in the same 
national political and cultural environment, each university can have its very specific 
university culture in which the decision making structure was developed, especially those 
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located in different layers of the HEI pyramid. It would thus be impossible to capture a true 
picture of the decision-making structure without considering the local context within which it 
occurred. Hence, this study decides to compare the institutionalization process in more than 
one university. Each university is the subject of an embedded, single case study. Units of 
analysis involve both the institutional and faculty levels. However, as the extensive resources 
and time required by conducting a multiple-case study is beyond the means of the author, only 
two universities were selected, each with only one faculty as the subunit of analysis.  
4.1.3 Rationales for the choice of cases 
There are three reasons behind the choice of University X and University Y.  First and 
foremost, both of them have opened new undergraduate programs since the issue of CUP 
2012 and Provisions 2012. The University X established two new undergraduate programs in 
different faculties in 2013 and three new undergraduate programs in 2014. The University Y 
introduced two undergraduate programs in 2014. The second rationale is illustrated in the 
previous section. University X and University Y are different types of university, the former 
locating in layer C of the pyramid of Chinese HEIs (see Figure1 on p. 21) while the latter in 
layer A. The inclusion of the two different universities is expected to provide a relatively 
comprehensive picture of Chinese higher education system. 
The third and very practically reason to choose these two universities lies in the 
comparatively easier access to the universities. China is a collectivist country, in which 
people are integrated early into strong and cohesive in-groups (Hofstede, Hofstede, & 
Minkov, 2010). If there is not a facilitated entry into the collectivist network, one may not be 
able to have access to the group and will not be able to get their trust. That is why guanxi3 is 
so important in social interactions. Without guanxi “one simply cannot get anything done” 
(Davies, Leung, Luk, & Wong, 2003, p. 43). This very different culture poses fundamental 
difficulty in gaining access which may not be experienced in the West when conducting 
participatory social science research in China (L. H. Zhou & Nunes, 2013). Aware of this 
difficulty, the author purposively chose University X where the author graduated. The 
decision to select University Y was made when the author obtained support of the dean of the 
case faculty under the help of a Norwegian professor. The dean recommended two leaders 
                                                 
3 Guanxi means intimate and reciprocal relationships among individuals in which favors and information are 
exchanged over time (L. H. Zhou & Nunes, 2013). 
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who are in charge of program development in the faculty and provided their personal contact 
information. However, this did not secure entry into the faculty as initially expected. As the 
author has no direct guanxi with the faculty or the university, only one leader agreed to 
participate, but refused to recommend more interviewees later. Without his recommendation, 
the author failed to gain consent from potential interviewees. Administrators and professors in 
China are not likely to volunteer readily or even agreed to be interviewed due to high levels of 
power distance and the lack of trust (L. H. Zhou & Nunes, 2013). The failure of gaining entry 
to enough interviewees in University Y may increase the possibility of misinterpretation, as 
the institutionalization process in this university could not be understood from a number of 
perspectives. This leads to the decision to treat University Y as a minor case. Inference on this 
case will be made based on the triangulation of the interviews with document analysis. 
4.2 Sources of evidence 
In order to identify how the power distribution in the introduction of undergraduate programs 
in our cases change (or not), we have to first focus on the formal changes, i.e. the legal 
framework, and then actual changes in the regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive 
aspects. Hence, this study is going to collect data from the following two sources.  
4.2.1 Documents 
A comprehensive collection of relevant documents was constructed from all the documents 
available on the official websites of MOE, universities and faculties. From this collection, 
documents dealing with the university governance and the processes on the undergraduate 
program introduction were selected. The analysis of these documents was done through 
comparison of episodes of documents at national and institutional levels. First, a comparison 
of episodes of policies on university governance reforms was made to examine formal 
changes in the establishment of undergraduate programs. For example, changes in structures 
that are responsible for various aspects of program introduction and their mutual 
relationships. Secondly, different versions of regulation on the governance and management 
of the institution were analyzed and compared to identify the extent of institutionalization of 
introducing undergraduate programs, including the clarification of bodies responsible for the 
decision-making as well as the formalization and standardization of procedures. Documents 
were also used to map the focus on the normative and cultural-cognitive aspects of program 
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introduction by examining changes in words and expressions on the status and responsibility 
of academic body. As most of these documents are of public interest, their authenticity and 
credibility can be considered to be high (Scott 1990, as cited in Bryman, 2012). Documents 
that have been used in this study are provided in Appendix 1. 
4.2.2 Interviews 
The interviews essentially serve to reveal how the process of setting up a new undergraduate 
program is taking place in practice. By interviewing university members involved in the 
decision-making process and members from the academic committee, it is also possible to 
investigate previous routines and informal aspects on the authority distribution in this 
dimension. Data collected from interviews will be coded in normative and cultural-cognitive 
categories in order to identify whether and how the new practice of program introduction 
resonates with the previous one in the organization in the normative and cultural aspects. 
Findings from interviews will be aligned with institutional document analysis to reveal how 
much the formal changes have been implemented in practice, i.e. the extent of 
institutionalization of practices for establishing new undergraduate programs. 
Eight semi-structured interviews have been conducted with interviewees at both institutional 
(2) and faculty levels (6). The interviewees were selected through purposive sampling. First, 
the initial interviewee was identified through the analysis of documents, website research and 
recommendation. More interviewees were identified and added after knowing the de facto 
procedure and decision-making participants from the first interview. All of the interviewees 
are the key members involved in the decision-making process and members of the academic 
committee. They have also been active for a long time in the case university, which makes it 
possible to catch a cultural-cognitive change. The composition of the interviewees is shown in 
the following table. For the reason of anonymity, only information on the position of 
interviewees is provided. 
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Table 4 Composition of interviewees  
Position Level Code 
Dean  Faculty UX-1 
Vice dean Faculty UX-2 
Academic committee member Faculty UX-3 
Academic committee member Faculty UX-4 
Academic committee member Institution UX-5 
Academic officer Institution UX-6 
Vice dean Faculty UY-7 
Academic committee member Faculty UY-8 
 
Each potential interviewee was initially contacted by email with an explanation on the 
research. The response rate was very low. Out of 13 contacted only one replied and agreed to 
participate. In cases where no response came, 8 phone calls were made and 7 were agreed to 
participate. Given the two universities are located in different cities and the lack of time and 
money, the face-to-face interviews were conducted only in University Y that is near to the 
residence of the author. The interviews with interviewees of University X were conducted 
through telephone. The author realizes the possible problem with the telephone interview (see 
e.g. Bryman, 2012), but interviewees of University X were quite expansive in their replies and 
there were no recording problems. The interviews normally took 30-60 minutes. All the 
interviews were held in Chinese with an interview guideline. The general interview guide was 
provided in Appendix 2, but it should be noted that the general interview guide was adapted 
to fit the interviewee according to his/her position. For one interviewee, some questions not 
on the list were also asked based on what he said.  
All interviewees agreed to be recorded and were completely anonymized according to the 
written or oral consent. Right after conducting an interview, the record was transcribed in 
Chinese. The quotes used in this thesis were translated by the author who is a Chinese native 
speaker. 
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4.3 Validity and limitations of the study 
4.3.1 Validity 
The discussion of the quality of this research follows Kleven (2008), which shares the same 
ontological and epistemological position of this study. Kleven (2008) provides four types of 
validity relevant in qualitative research: construct validity that concerns the extent to which 
the indicators represent constructs, statistical validity concerning if a tendency is trivial or not, 
internal validity which concerns inferences to causal explanation between elements, and 
external validity that concerns the generalizability of inferences. As this thesis has assured 
that tendency identified is not trivial through literature review and research design, it only 
discusses construct validity, internal validity and external validity here. 
Construct validity  
Construct validity concerns the quality of conceptualization and operationalization of 
concepts being studied, thus it can be seen as the foundation for other tests of quality. In order 
to ensure the quality of conceptualization, main emphasis is given to the clear definition of 
relevant concepts, for example, the definition of academic authority and the relevant form of 
academic authority for this study. Another example is the conceptualization of institution in 
terms of regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive components and the related 
conceptualization of institutionalization through the alignment of these three components. 
The study also clarifies how the concepts are operationalized. First, a number of indicators are 
identified in each aspect of the institution for authority distribution in Chinese universities 
based on the literature review on the governance of Chinese higher education. Second, the 
extent of institutionalization is explained in terms of three levels (see Chapter 2) to measure 
how much has changed in the authority distribution in case universities. Apart from the clear 
definition of concepts and clarification of their operationalization, multiple sources of 
evidence (document analysis and interviews) have been used in order to increase construct 
validity (Yin, 2014). 
Internal validity 
The issue of internal validity pertains to how far it is possible to make inferences from 
operationalized construct. The two major threats to internal validity of this study are the 
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quality of empirical data and the means to deal with these data. The latter threat is dealt with 
by developing a robust analytical framework and by discussing the adaptation of the elements 
of the analytical framework to identify changes in the authority distribution in undergraduate 
program introduction.  
The first threat is taken care of by efforts to achieve conceptual equivalence when translating 
interview guideline. The interview guideline was designed in English and consulted with the 
supervisor. Aware of some nonequivalent translation between English and Chinese in certain 
concepts of university governance (see, e.g. Zhong & Hayhoe, 2001), the author verified the 
translation of concepts and terms by referring to Chinese publications on intra-university 
governance and by semi-pilot testing with two Chinese professors. This allowed removing 
potential terminological ambiguities and conceptual misunderstanding of interviewees. 
However, the author does acknowledge the possibility of misinterpretation due to the small 
number of interviewees. To improve the internal validity of inference, the University Y is 
considered as a minor case, simply used to provide a glimpse of the diversity of Chinese 
higher education system. As for University X, it remains to be highly centralized (more detain 
in Chapter 5). Not many people are involved in the decision-making in the faculty, and those 
who were involved were included in the sample. Therefore, it should be able to capture the 
real dynamics concerning changes in authority distribution in that case university.  
External validity 
External validity deals with the possibility of generalizing the finding of a case study to a 
wider context or other contexts. As mentioned earlier, Chinese public HEIs are diverse. It is 
thus problematic to produce general knowledge based on a study of two cases. However, the 
findings of this study can offer working hypothesis that may be appropriate for understanding 
other similar cases. This form of generalization is called ‘naturalistic generalization’, and it 
places the responsibility for making generalizations more on the reader than on the writer 
(Stake, 2009). To enhance external validity of inference, this study provided a thick 
description of the cases to allow readers to assess the degree of similarity between cases 
investigated and those to which the findings are to be applied.  
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4.3.2 Limitations of the study 
Apart from the limitation of small sample size discussed above, there are two more 
limitations. First, this study only focuses on the authority redistribution in the establishment 
of undergraduate programs. It does not systematically analyze the changes in the internal 
governance structure beyond the program introduction at the bachelor level. The narrow focus 
of this study was seen as a necessary limitation, because it allows for a closer analysis on the 
effect of internal governance reforms in one particular dimension that directly affects the 
primary activities and the positioning of the university. Moreover, change in the locus of 
decision-making in this dimension is not a separate issue from organizational change of 
university governance. They are closely interlocked in the way that progress in one promotes 
the other. Therefore, the narrow focus of this study might be considered less problematic than 
it seems at first sight. 
Second, the study is also limited in terms of the time period under analysis, as the 
implementation period is short in examining changes in higher education. Different choices 
on the cases have implications on how much changes will be identified, as the local contexts 
of the university are very diverse. Universities located in the same level of the pyramid of 
Chinese HEIs may have different degree of autonomy in this dimension in different 
provinces, and this affects the authority redistribution within universities, as indicated by an 
interviewee. Nevertheless, this limitation will be explicitly discussed in relation to the 
conclusions drawn and suggestions for future research in the Conclusion chapter. 
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5 FINDINGS 
This chapter presents findings in two stages. In the first stage the actual establishment 
procedure at University X and Y will be examined in detail. The crucial questions to ask are: 
How is the proposal for new undergraduate degree program developed? Who are relevant 
actors? And how they interact with each other? In the second section, the establishment 
procedures at two universities are analyzed and discussed according to institutional indicators 
presented earlier in the conceptual framework in order to see how the power relation has been 
altered in the decision-making structure of program establishment. However, as data are 
collected only from Faculty B at University Y, the analysis and discussion is mainly focused 
on the faculty level. Finally, a comparison is made between the two universities in order to 
identify possible factors that affect their ability and willingness to implement reform policies. 
5.1 Characterizing the Process of Undergraduate 
Program Establishment 
5.1.1 Program introduction procedure at the bachelor level in University X 
According to the Manual of Educational Management and complemented with interviews, the 
establishment of new undergraduate programs takes the following steps. 
1. Planning and announcement 
Purpose of the first stage is planning and announcement. TAO makes an annual development 
plan of undergraduate degree program according to the University’s Five-Year Plan, which is 
approved by the University’s CPC. TAO determines the number of new programs to be 
established in one year and informs faculties of the timeline and detailed procedures and 
requirements for establishing a new undergraduate program (UX-5).  
2. Preparation for application at the faculty 
Purpose of this stage is to make and approves proposals on new bachelor’s programs. Usually 
proposals and decisions for new undergraduate programs are made within the faculty or 
department. After making decisions on which program to establish, the vice dean for 
educational matters needs to produce a report on the analysis of market demand and 
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assessment of faculty resources available for providing this program. This report is submitted 
it to TAO together with application forms (UX-3).  
In Faculty A ideas for establishing new programs usually come from the faculty leadership 
(UX-2). When the Faculty planned to establish a new undergraduate program in 2013, the 
vice-dean for educational matters proposed two programs (UX-2). However, the two 
proposals were not known to faculty members (UX-4 & 5). The selection was made by the 
vice-dean alone after discussing privately with other deans and gaining their approval (UX-2). 
When the new program to be introduced is decided, professors and associate professors who 
are qualified to teach core areas were called upon to complete the application form attached to 
Provisions 2012 (UX-5). The application form asks for basic information about the degree 
program including a statement of purpose and need, expected enrollment size in each of its 
first five years of operation, the curriculum, and the availability of resources for the program, 
etc. The final application form is submitted to TAO together with other required materials for 
preliminary review. 
3. Preliminary Assessment 
When TAO receives the application from a faculty, it evaluates the general quality by 
examining for example whether the proposed curriculum meets national and institutional 
curriculum requirements and creates a pre-selection list of candidate programs (UX-1). The 
vice-dean and program director from qualified faculties will receive an invitation to the 
presentation at the oral defense. In practice this stage is where administrative intervention is 
most likely to take place in University X (UX-3). Faculty A had submitted its application 
twice in 2013. The application was rejected the first time simply because a vice president who 
was not charged with educational affairs found the materials presented in the forms 
unacceptable. However, when the almost same materials were submitted two months later, it 
was accepted and approved (UX-4). 
4. Oral defense 
The focus of the Oral Defense Committee is primarily on strategic aspects when reviewing 
program applications. Questions raised concern three aspects: the influence of the proposed 
program on the existing program structure of the university and its alignment with the 
University’s strategic position; market demands; and facilities (UX-6). Membership of the 
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committee is dependent on the program to be assessed. University leaders and directors of 
relevant administrative units are permanent members of this committee. The other members 
are external experts (at least three) who are invited by TAO and work in relevant subject areas 
(UX-6). These external experts, whose presence is required by the local government, mainly 
concern themselves with the intellectual development in the relevant field (UX-1). According 
to the presentation of the candidate faculty, the Committee produces a list of those qualified.  
5. Task of the Academic Committee 
In this stage the Academic Committee of the University is called upon by TAO to review the 
result of the Oral Defense Committee (UX-6). The Academic Committee prepares an 
assessment according to specified criteria and categories. Members of the Academic 
Committee receive an abstract of the application and the list of review criteria from TAO 
(UX-5). They grade individually the application according to the criteria and fill out a 
comment form. The grading form and comment form are then sent to TAO for calculation. On 
the basis of their grading and comments TAO calculates the average score of each application 
and selects those getting the highest scores for final approval by the Council of Presidents.  
6. Final decision 
The Council of Presidents decides whether to accept or reject the recommendation. In practice 
“the review of the Council is now more of a formality”, and the Council seldom rejects the 
recommendation of the Academic Committee (UX-6). However, it should be noted that 
members of the Council overlaps with the oral defense committee. The Council is made up of 
all university leaders, while they are also permanent members of the oral defense committee.  
According to the above examination, the following actors and their roles in the procedures of 
establishing new undergraduate programs have been identified and are presented in Table 5.  
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Table 5 Approval process for new undergraduate programs in University X 
Sequential 
Procedure 
Actors Roles 
Proposal 
Development 
Vice-dean 
Proposing and deciding the program to 
be offered 
Instructors Completing application forms 
Preliminary 
Assessment 
Directors of Teaching 
Affairs Office 
Preparing pre-selection by evaluating 
general qualification; 
Coordinating to relevant committees 
Oral Defense 
University leaders; 
Reviewing and making selection based 
primarily on administrative 
considerations 
Directors of relevant 
administrative offices; 
External experts working 
in relevant subject area 
Selection 
Proposal 
Academic Committee 
Reviewing the decision of the oral 
defense committee according to 
specified criteria and schema 
Final 
approval 
Council of Presidents Endorsing the selection proposal 
 
In the beginning, the vice-dean for educational matters reflects on possible undergraduate 
degree programs and makes decisions after consulting with other deans. Then instructors are 
called upon to prepare a detailed proposal and fill in application forms. Consequently, faculty 
members are rather attending actors than actual decision-makers. Completed application 
forms have to be vetted by TAO and approved by Oral Defense Committee, Academic 
Committee and Council of Presidents. The institutional approval focuses mainly on market 
demands and infrastructure (UX-2, 3, 5, & 6). 
5.1.2 Program introduction procedure at the bachelor level in University Y 
The establishment process at University Y is described in the chart Procedural Chart of 
Establishing New Undergraduate Degree Programs. Information on the departmental 
procedure part is primarily based on interviews. The whole procedure follows a similar 
routing process of University X. 
1. Planning and announcement 
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The annual establishment of new undergraduate programs in the university is initiated when 
TAO announces the timeline for application on its website. The announcement also describes 
the general procedure of program introduction 
2. Preparation for application within faculties 
Proposals for new undergraduate degree programs are made by Faculty Executive Committee, 
but regular faculty members can make suggestions on what new program to establish (UX-7). 
The proposal must be sent to the Faculty Professor Committee for review and vote. After 
discussion on the historical development of the faculty and the relationship of the proposed 
program to existing programs within the university, the Professor Committee of Faculty B 
unanimously approved the proposal (UY-8). When the decision is made on what new program 
to introduce, the vice-dean for educational matters analyzes similar programs offered by other 
prestigious research universities at home and abroad, and produces a study report. After 
comparing the advantage and disadvantage of Faculty B in providing the proposed program, 
the vice-dean designed a training plan. Both the report and the proposed curriculum are 
reported to Faculty Executive Committee and the Professors Committee for preliminary 
review. Then the curriculum and other teaching issues must be vetted by Faculty Teaching 
Committee in consideration of comments from the above two committees. The completed 
application forms are then submitted to TAO for institutional approval.  
3. Preliminary assessment 
Purpose of this stage is to assist initiators in the inclusion of all elements required to the 
review by the Teaching Committee. TAO also assess the curriculum to see if the national and 
institutional curriculum regulations are adequately satisfied. The examination process can be 
iterative because TAO does not forward the application of the initiating faculty to the 
Teaching Committee until all required elements are included in the application package.  
4. The task of the Teaching Committee  
Purpose of the fourth stage is that the Teaching Committee produces a pre-selection list of 
candidate programs. The Teaching Committee is a subunit of the Academic Committee and is 
responsible for deliberating applications for new undergraduate programs. The Committee 
invites all initiating faculties and departments to the oral defense (UY-7). On the basis of the 
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presentation and discussion with the initiators the Teaching Committee makes a pre-selection 
of candidate programs and sends it to the president for final approval. 
5. Final approval 
The President decides which pre-selected applications to approved after the review of Council 
of Presidents on the grounds of suitability. As explained by the vice-dean, the Council’s 
review focuses primarily on issues including the availability of resources needed to establish 
the new undergraduate program as well as the compliance with the University’s rules and 
policies. The application package of selected programs has to be publicized on TAO’s 
website. An additional group of experts will be invited by TAO if there is dissent to that 
decision within campus. A copy of the approved application is then sent to go public for one 
month on the MOE’s website for feedbacks and MOE’s verification. 
Based on the above reconstruction of the process of establishing new undergraduate 
programs, the following actors and their respective roles have been identified, as shown in 
Table 6.  
Table 6 Approval process for new undergraduate programs in University Y 
Sequential 
Procedure 
Actors Roles 
Proposal 
development 
Faculty Executive 
Committee 
Proposing the program to be offered 
Faculty Professor 
Committee 
Reviewing and approving the proposal 
 
Vice-dean 
Market analysis which is reported to the 
Executive Committee and Professor Committee;  
Curriculum design 
Faculty Teaching 
Committee 
Reviewing proposed curriculum and other 
relevant teaching and learning matters 
Preliminary 
assessment 
Directors of TAO 
Examining the completeness of the application 
package; 
Evaluate Curriculum based on the national and 
institutional curriculum framework 
Oral Defense 
and 
assessment 
Teaching Committee 
Producing a pre-selection list based on the 
presentation of and discussion with initiators 
Final 
approval 
President 
Making final decisions; 
Endorsing approval within university 
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New undergraduate program proposals are usually made by Faculty Executive Committee and 
initially reviewed by the Professor Committee for approval. After the approval of Professor 
Committee, the vice-dean for educational matters designs the curriculum after consulting the 
Faculty Executive Committee and Professor Committee. The curriculum is then sent to the 
Faculty Teaching Committee for review and approval. The final application forms and other 
required material is then routed to TAO for campus review. When there is no problem with 
application materials, TAO send these applications to the Teaching Committee for pre-
selection. The president makes final decision after consulting with the Council of Presidents. 
By comparing the establishment procedures at University X and University Y, it can be seen 
that the locus of decision making at faculty and institutional level differs in the two 
universities. At the faculty level, the final authority to approve the proposed undergraduate 
program is lodged in administrators at University X, whereas this final authority is held by 
academics through Faculty Professor Committee at University Y. At the institutional level, 
there are three actual decision-makers at University X: TAO, Oral Defense Committee and 
the Academic Committee. However, there are two actual decision-makers at University Y: the 
Teaching Committee and the president. The responsibility of TAO is to assist the initiating 
faculty in the inclusion of required material. It has no right to reject the application. The share 
of influence of administrators and academics in these committees will be analyzed in the 
following section, after an in-depth analysis on the Academic Committee at the two 
universities. 
5.2 Analyzing the Establishment of New Undergraduate 
Programs 
5.2.1 Analyzing the Establishment of New Undergraduate Programs in 
University X 
Institutionalization in the regulative pillar 
The regulative institution deals with the standardization and formalization of procedures. 
Regulatory processes on institutionalizing power reallocation in undergraduate program 
establishment involve the formulation of rules that cover and apply invariably to all 
circumstances under which the establishment occurs, as well as the standardization of role 
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definition. The former is mainly demonstrated via changing regulations, while the latter is 
reflected in the clarity of formal power distribution at institutional and faculty levels. 
 Change in regulations 
Regulation concerning the establishment of undergraduate degree programs at University X is 
briefly described in the Manual of Educational Management that became active in November 
2001. As the establishment process follows requirements in the Provisions 1999 and of the 
local government (e.g. the inclusion of external experts), this regulation only mentions two 
institutional reviewing agencies without enumerating their responsibilities: TAO and the 
Academic Committee. Detailed description on actors and their functions can be found on the 
undergraduate program establishment announcement published by TAO. In the 
Undergraduate Program Establishment Announcement published in April 2015, there is an 
exchange of order between the Academic Committee and the Oral Defense Committee. 
According to this year’s Announcement, application forms approved by TAO will be sent to 
the Academic Committee for second-round selection, and then candidate faculties are invited 
to the presentation for recommendations on editing application forms.  No radical formal 
changes have been introduced concerning decision-making locus inside and outside 
university, as the affiliated government still follows Provisions 1999 rather than Provisions 
2012 (UX-6). The final decision-making power remains reside with the provincial 
government.  
 Clarity on the allocation of formal authority 
Concerning roles of relevant actors in the decision-making process, the University has been 
trying to define their responsibilities, especially those of administrative and academic units. In 
the University’s 12th Five-Year Development Plan issued in February 2012 it states that “we 
should clarify responsibilities of university leadership, administrative offices and academic 
units, delegate more power to the latter in order to initiate their activity and creativity in 
issues such as teaching, research, disciplinary development and personnel management”. 
However, according to the Annual Development Plan 2015 issued in March 2015, one 
mission of the university in 2015 is to “clarify roles and structures of administrative units and 
faculties and departments in order to improve autonomy of operating units.” Over the past 
three years, the University has not published formal documents that define the authority of 
faculties and departments.  
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Available governing documents are centered on the power of the Standing Committee of 
CCP, the Council of Presidents. In 2012 the University revised bylaws of these two bodies, 
and published Interim Regulations on Decision-making Process for Important Matters in 
November 2014 as a direct response to state regulations that demand collective decision-
making on important issues. However, there are conflicts in the locus of decision-making for 
teaching and research issues. According to the Interim Regulations on Decision-making 
Process for Important Matters, the Standing Committee of CCP is the steering core of the 
university, and takes responsibility for deciding the appointment for mid-level managers, 
resource allocation for vital projects, and major academic matters including program 
establishment, while the Council of Presidents is the top executer in charge of implementing 
decisions of the Standing Committee of CCP and day-to-day decisions. Whereas, functions of 
the Council of Presidents enumerated in the Bylaw of the Council of Presidents includes 
“studying academic issues such as teaching, research, and program development and making 
decisions.” Despite the revision and formulation of regulations, the available documents at 
University X are insufficient to provide clarity regarding the authority of stakeholders in the 
academic decision-making process.  
Institutionalization in the normative pillar 
The normative institution prescribes appropriate activities for particular individuals in 
specified positions through socially created norms and values. Institutional work on the 
normative aspects contains incorporation and outward reflection of socialized norms for 
modern university governance in university regulations. 
 The socialized norms and values on the legitimate sources of authority in China in this 
dimension 
Governance reform in Chinese HEIs has been guided by “rationalized myth” (Christensen, 
2007) introduced from the west that fits the notion of university. As an academic institution 
that gives priority to education as an end to itself, the university is a normative organization 
and rich in ideologies. In terms of normative standards for university governance, the 
common understanding of roles of two major authorities in the university governance and 
management is that academics should have priority over academic matters, while managers 
and external stakeholders having priority over other matters. This norm is consistent with the 
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shared belief in professional organizations that those with expertise in an institution’s core 
technologies should have some important role in governing them. 
The above rationalized myth has been adopted and manifested in the Outline of China’s 
National Plan for Medium and Long-term Education Reform and Development (2010-2020). 
The Outline stipulates that “full scope will be given to the role of academic committee in 
program establishment, academic evaluation and development”, and “professors shall be 
given a full play in teaching, research and university governance”. Since then, it has been an 
important agenda in university reforms to improve faculty participation in university 
governance.  In 2011 MOE published the Temporary Provisions for the Formulation of 
University Charter, demanding all public HEIs to formulate their charters and get them 
approved by September 2015. The major aim is to augment formalization and standardization 
of internal governance structure. In 2012 Provisions 1999 was revised and published to 
change the role of academic committee from pingyi to shenyi in the review process of new 
undergraduate program applications. The role of the Academic Committee is further protected 
with the issue of Regulations on the Academic Committee in Higher Education Institutions in 
January 2014, which prescribes membership requirements and the status of the supreme 
academic body within universities. These calls to alter the governance structure in order to 
augment faculty involvement in academic governance demonstrate an acceptance of concepts 
of shared governance and collegiality.  
 The common vocabulary on the university regulations on the authority distribution 
None of the governing and managing regulations revised or formulated between 2010 and 
2015 incorporate or manifest the above-mentioned concepts in the description of decision-
making procedures. The only reflection of the new concept is in the University’s 12th Five-
Year Development Plan and Annual Development Plan 2015, with the same expression that 
calls to “strengthen functions of Academic Committee, Degree Committee and Teaching 
Committee in university governance, giving full scope to the role of professors in decision-
making for teaching, research and program development issues.” In short, University X has 
not adopted the rationalized myth on university governance yet, and thus shows little 
resonance with environmental norms and values. 
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Institutionalization in cultural-cognitive pillar 
Institutionalization in the cultural-cognitive aspect contains the increasing shared conceptions 
of what are legitimate authority in program establishment, which is reflected in the changing 
composition and status of the Academic Committee and the increasing taken-for-grantedness 
of the new practice in the program establishment. 
 The composition and status of the Academic Committee 
Membership of Academic Committee was changed for the first time in June 2012. Current 
committee is composed of 35 members, as shown in Table 7. The president is the ex-officio 
chair of the committee, which is stipulated in the Bylaw of Academic Committee issued in 
2007. There are two vice chairs, both of whom are vice presidents with one responsible for 
undergraduate education and the other for graduate education. According to the Bylaw of 
Academic Committee, candidates for vice chairs are nominated by the president, and elected 
by Academic Committee. However, they are actually nominated among vice presidents, 
which appears to be a consensus within the university, as UX-4 commented “the chair is the 
president, and the vice chair is of course the vice president. This does not need any 
explanation” (emphasis in original). The Bylaw does not prescribe the selection of regular 
members. According to UX-4, they are nominated merely by their faculty leadership and 
appointed by the president.  
Table 7 Composition of Academic Committee at University X 
Membership Identity Number 
Chair  President  1 
Vice chair Vice president 2 
Regular members 
Pure professors4 7 
Dean 10 
Vice Dean 3 
Director of administrative office 8 
 
                                                 
4 The term “pure professors” refers to full-time professors who do not have administrative title. As university 
leaders and directors of administrative offices are also full-time professors in Chinese universities, the word 
“pure” is used to distinguish between professors who have an administrative title and those who do not. 
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The Academic Committee of Faculty A comprises of 13 members, with 3 deans and 10 
professors and associated professors. Member selection at the faculty is made by faculty 
leadership, elaborated by UX-3: 
The University regulates that the chair must be the responsible person of the 
faculty. As for other members, I don’t know how they are selected. I began to 
work in this university in 2008. It seems since then I have been a member of the 
Faculty Academic Committee, because they (deans) always invite me to attend 
meetings. I am not even quite clear how I became the vice chair.  I was simply 
told by the chair in a meeting that I was the vice chair. There is no election in the 
committee or within our faculty. 
This administrator-dominated composition and membership selection has a negative influence 
on the role of the Academic Committee in the university’s governance. Despite the fact that 
presidents, directors and deans are senior professors at their faculties and still have tasks of 
teaching and research, they are not trusted by faculty members to act in their interests.  
Directors and deans are appointed and have to report to presidents and party 
secretary, thus they will follow their leaders’ instructions. Besides, they are 
different from pure professors. The former has power to allocate resources, while 
the latter does not. Although they have a title of professor, what they are playing 
actually is the role of administrators. The Academic Committee is expected to 
monitor the exercise of administrative power and prevent power monopoly at the 
university. The inclusion of too many leaders will jeopardize the real function of 
the Academic Committee, because they are too powerful and always set the tone 
for the meeting and thus decisions. Actually, most of the time we (pure professors) 
are obliged to act passively. (UX-3) 
Professors with administrative title, due to their positions, are primarily 
concerned with management. They are representatives of administrative power. 
This does not necessarily mean that their decisions are not correct, but the 
inclusion of too many academic leaders inevitably leads to the neglect of faculty 
voice. (UX-4) 
Administrators do not trust the ability of pure professors in university governance either.  
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Presidents, directors and deans are not only leading professors in their academic 
fields at the university, but also have more experience in university management 
and a better understanding of external environments. Their ability of making 
strategic, useful recommendations and suggestion is stronger than pure 
professors. The latter is good at making recommendations at disciplinary levels, 
but relatively weak at macro and institutional levels. (UX-6) 
The lack of trust between academic administrators and pure professors suggests that there is 
no clear definition on the functions of the Academic Committee, leading to controversy about 
the legitimate authority in academic governance. The above membership change has not 
transformed the symbolic nature of the Academic Committee to being an integral part of the 
university. As such the Academic Committee retains to be subordinated to the Office of 
Science and Technology, which is responsible for providing secretariat and other support to 
the Committee, as illustrated in Figure 3 (P. 29).  
 Previous de facto routines of decision-making in the undergraduate program establishment 
Both documents and interview suggests that actual introduction procedure for new 
undergraduate degree programs has not been changed yet. In addition to the bottom-up 
procedures described earlier in this chapter, the University also adopts top-down procedures.  
Faculties have some autonomy in opening a new undergraduate degree program. 
However, their autonomy is restricted by their lack of personnel and financial 
autonomy. The new program they can propose to set up is based on the existing 
resources that are available to support its implementation. For example, if the 
size and expertise of faculty members is not adequate to teach core areas of 
proposed program, the faculty has to give up because they cannot recruit 
teachers. Academic recruitment is controlled by Personnel Management Office. 
In situations where bottom-up decision-making procedure is not feasible, top-
down procedures are adopted. (UX-6) 
The maintenance of previous routines could be obstacles to improving faculty participation in 
the approval process of new undergraduate programs. On the one hand, the decision-making 
power at faculty level resides in the hand of deans, leaving little room to manoeuvre to faculty 
members. On the other hand, administrative intervention is likely to occur at the university 
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approval level due to the lack of coercive mechanisms. Moreover, the voice of pure professors 
is difficult to be heard in the Academic Committee dominated by powerful academic 
administrators, as there is no shared understanding on the functions of the Academic 
Committee and the appropriate way for academic leaders to behave in this agency.  
The level of Institutionalization 
It can be seen from the above analysis that the level of institutionalizing power redistribution 
in the decision-making process of undergraduate program establishment is very low.  Changes 
in regulations have been made without incorporating socialized norms. These regulatory 
changes focus only on enumerating central powers. However, this has not led to increased 
formal power of the Academic Committee and faculties. The changes in the membership of 
the Academic Committee are more a direct response to Temporary Provisions for the 
Formulation of University Charter than a result of a shared commitment to the role of the 
academic committee in the new undergraduate program approval. As a consequent, the 
function and status of the Academic Committee remain unchanged.  
The shallow level of institutionalization implies a poor implementation of reforms polices to 
increasing academic capacity in institutional governance. Hence, there is little redistribution 
of authority at University X in academic program approval. The central administrators 
continue to retain primary influence by maintaining control over the selection of 
administrators and members of the Academic Committee and budgetary matters. The fact that 
they hold a concurrent post in the Academic Committee also constrains input from pure 
professors in the absence of shared perception of legitimate power in the approving process. 
However, the institutional work at University X is continuing. The University is now 
adjusting the ratio of pure professor to administrators to augment academics’ influence, but 
this change is being adopted in accord with Regulations on the Academic Committee in 
Higher Education Institutions, which stipulates that number of pure professors should not be 
less than 50% (UX-6). It is also working towards a higher level of regulatory 
institutionalization. According to the interviewees, the University is drafting its Charter and 
revising Bylaws of Academic Committee in order to clarify roles of each actor and formalize 
decision-making structure.  
 55 
 
5.2.2 Analyzing the Establishment of New Undergraduate Programs in 
University Y 
Institutionalization in the regulative pillar 
 Change in regulations 
There is no radical change in the formal bottom-up procedures of undergraduate program 
introduction at faculty and institutional levels (UX-7). However, since part of discretionary 
power is shifted from MOE to the University in 2012, the University has been 
formulating/revising Bylaws of governing bodies and various committees at the university. 
On the basis of these new Bylaws, the University has developed charts to formalize decision-
making procedures of Academic Committee and approval process of undergraduate program 
establishment in 2014. The procedural chart for approving undergraduate programs is 
presented in Appendix 3. 
 Clarity on the allocation of formal authority 
Before the formulation and revision of existing governing regulations, the power relation at 
the University was similar to University X. According to the University’s Study Report on 
Establishing World-Class University5 published in April 2010, there were two problems in its 
governance structure.  The first was the centralization of power, with administrative offices 
controlling the majority of financial and academic recourses. Linked to the first one was the 
failure of formulating adequate formal rules that clearly define responsibilities and 
accountabilities of every actor. To implement solutions given in the Study Report, the 
University restarted formulating its Charter (UX-8), and got it approved in 2014.  
The Charter prescribes power distribution at horizontal and vertical levels. At horizontal level, 
power is allocated among three governing bodies: the CPC is the highest decision-making 
body at the university, responsible for decisions on vision and mission; the president is the top 
executer and decision-maker for specific administrative matters; while the Academic 
Committee is the supreme academic agency exercising right to make final decisions, 
deliberate, or provide advices in academic decisions. The bylaws of the three bodies further 
                                                 
5 Study Report on Establishing World-Class University includes two major parts: one is the analysis of 
characteristics of world-class universities and a comparison between the University and these WCUs in 
quantified terms such as publications and fund; the other part is the analysis of problems facing the University in 
building itself into a World-Class University and guidelines for future reforms. 
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enumerate their duties and prescribe the agenda setting and decision-making process. At 
vertical level, power is devolved to faculties, which empowers them to making their own 
development plans and rules, and deciding academic recruitment and recourse allocation. 
Within faculties, the Faculty Executive Committee is the decision-making agency for 
administrative matters. The Faculty Academic Committee or Professor Committee (if 
established) controls important academic matters under the guidance of institutional 
Academic Committee. 
Institutionalization in the normative pillar 
As socialized norms concerning undergraduate program establishment has been presented in 
the previous part, analysis here focuses simply on the common vocabularies on the 
University’s written documents. 
 The common vocabulary on the university regulations on the authority distribution 
The new concepts of shared governance and collegiality are reflected in the new phrase added 
to the existing governance phrases in the University’s Plan for Medium and Long-term 
Development (2011-2020): “professors control over academic matters” (jiaoshouzhixue).  The 
addition of this new phrase is directly driven by the University’s mission to build a WCU and 
national policies. 
In 2010 our university conducted a study to analyze common features of some 
world best universities. We found that there are two primary principles for 
building a WCU. Both of them are concerned with internal governance. The first 
is let those who are most qualified to control. The second is decisions on certain 
matters should be made at basic level. But these international norms caused hot 
debate within university at that time, as it was not quite compatible with national 
regulations and culture. Some advocated to adopt those norms if the university 
was to build itself into a WCU, while the rest argued for building our own 
governance model. Later in the same year, MOE called for building a modern 
university system. When drafting Development Plan (2011-2020), the committee 
responsible for drafting took feedbacks from both sides into consideration. 
Finally, our goal of governance reform is defined as changing from a 
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bureaucratic dominated and highly centralized model to a shared, relatively 
decentralized model. (UX-8) 
This new governing phrase is manifested in the changing status of the Academic Committee 
from a consultancy agency to “supreme academic agency” that “safeguards professors’ 
participation in academic governance”, as stated in the Charter. Such status has changed 
academic agenda setting process of the Standing Committee of CCP and the Council of 
Presidents. According to the Charter and Bylaws of these two governing bodies, academic 
agenda can be determined only after deliberation by Academic Committee if it has no final 
authority, such as the establishment of new undergraduate programs; they are set for meetings 
only after deliberation by Academic Committee. 
Cultural-cognitive institution 
 The composition and status of the Academic Committee and the Teaching Committee 
The Academic Committee and the Teaching Committee at University Y were first established 
in 2001. The members, chair and vice chairs are nominated by the CPC and appointed by the 
president to serve for a two-year term which may be renewed in accordance with Bylaw of 
Academic Committee (2001).  However, members had been reappointed only once in the 
following ten years, which suggests a poor implementation of the Bylaw. In 2011 Bylaw of 
Academic Committee was first revised which stipulates in detail requisite qualifications and 
the selection methods for membership, leading to the second membership change of the 
Committee. According to the revised Bylaw, members are nominated by their faculty 
Academic Committee and appointed by the president for a five-year term in consultation with 
the Council of Presidents. The chair and vice chairs are nominated by the Academic 
Committee and appointed by the president. The result of such selection for the current 
membership of Academic Committee is that among the total 40 members there are 14 
academic administrators and 26 pure professors. Detailed membership identity is presented in 
Table 8.   
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Table 8 Composition of the Academic Committee at University Y 
Membership Identity Number 
Chair  Pure professor 1 
Vice chair 
Pure professor 8 
Executive Vice President 1 
Regular members 
Pure professors 13 
Dean 11 
Vice dean 2 
Honorary member  4 
 
The composition of the Teaching Committee includes 34 members, as shown in Table 9. 
Among 29 regular members, there are 13 academic administrators. However, it is worth 
noting that almost all of these deans and vice deans are members of National Teaching 
Committee in their academic field of study.  
Table 9 Composition of the Teaching Committee at University Y 
Membership Identity Number 
Chair  Pure professor 1 
Vice chair Pure professor 4 
Regular members 
Pure professors 12 
dean 8 
Vice dean 5 
Administrative director 2 
 
The more democratic selection of membership indicates to some degree a power shift from 
university leaders to the Academic Committee. It provides a coercive solution to possible 
problems of administrative power dominating academic decisions, as “the reduction in the 
number of academic administrators has facilitated a relatively independent relation between 
administrative power and academic power” (UX-8). Consequently, the Academic Committee 
at University Y is not subordinated to any administrative offices, as shown in Figure 4. 
However, Bylaws of Academic Committee revised in 2011 and 2014 does not exclude 
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administrators from the Academic Committee, because as one respondent pointed out, there 
must be some administrators to serve as communication channels between administrative 
offices and the Academic Committee.   
 Previous de facto routines of decision-making in the undergraduate program establishment 
Actual decision-making process for undergraduate program establishment before 2012 was 
the same as described in the last section. 
In 2011 our faculty established an interdepartmental undergraduate program. 
The procedure is almost the same with that in 2013, except that final decision was 
made by MOE. If there should be changes, it mainly takes place at the 
institutional level. However, institutional change has little influence on faculty 
procedures. In our faculty, program establishment has been following the same 
routing. (UX-7) 
In Faculty B consensus has been reached among faculty leadership that decisions on 
undergraduate program establishment must be made collectively by all professors. As the 
UX-7 remarked, 
We will not apply to open a new undergraduate program if the Professor 
Committee rejects the proposal. The implementation of a new program will lead 
to reallocation of financial and human recourses, so all professors must be 
involved to express their opinions.   
As a consequence, the final discretionary power resides in the Faculty Professor Committee 
within faculties. The delegation of power to pure professors and the complete alignment of 
previous de facto procedures with the new actual practice indicate an increasing shared belief 
in the legitimacy of faculty members participating in the decision-making process of 
undergraduate program establishment, at least at faculty level.  
The level of institutionalization 
Institutionalization of faculty participation in new undergraduate program approval at 
University Y is initiated by the conscious adoption of international standards. The spread and 
contextualization of these norms has resulted in regulatory changes that facilitate, supplement 
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and support normative intuitions, including the clarification of powers of faculties and 
Academic Committee and the formalization of decision-making procedures. The interaction 
and reinforcement between regulative and normative institutionalization is in turn promoting 
institutionalization in cultural-cognitive pillar by enhancing academics’ influence in the 
Academic Committee. The robust institutionalization in regulative and normative pillars has 
led to a gradual transfer of parts of power from administrators to academics. At faculty level, 
the faculty exercises primary responsibility through the Professor Committee. At institutional 
level, the input of academics is assured through the increasing independence of the Academic 
Committee, a more democratic membership selection as well as increasing transparency of 
institutional decision-making. However, it is not clear if this division of power in the 
approving process of new undergraduate programs has become or will be more permanent 
and objectified, due to the lack of empirical data on the review process of Teaching 
Committee. What is clear from empirical data is that there is consensus within the university, 
especially among university leaders that faculty participation in university governance is a 
necessary condition for success. This consensus is likely to promote movement towards 
objectification of power balance between academics and administrators in approving new 
undergraduate programs. 
5.3 Comparing the establishment procedures at 
University X and Y 
Both of the two universities were established in the centrally planned economic era, and 
managed their academic affairs by focusing on centralized administrative power. However, 
despite the same starting point in the governance reform and the same cultural constrains, the 
two universities differ in the level of institutionalizing authority reallocation in the decision-
making process of undergraduate program establishment. Such variation in institutional 
responses can be explained, at least in part by examining how the degree of institutional 
autonomy and logic of behavior affect their ability and willingness to implement formal 
changes in undergraduate program establishment. 
5.3.1 Degree of institutional autonomy 
University X and University Y vary greatly in the degree of institutional autonomy in 
undergraduate program establishment. 
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The autonomy in opening a new undergraduate program differs in universities 
managed by the central and provincial governments. For universities affiliated to 
MOE, when they decide which new programs to open, they only need to submit 
required documentation to MOE for filing. MOE does not participate in their 
decision-making process. While for HEIs affiliated to provincial government, 
there is little change. But for provincial universities located in Shanghai and 
Jiangsu, they also have the autonomy. The provincial government steers 
according to its fiscal conditions. In our province, the government still follows 
previous approval process despite the type of undergraduate programs.  (UX-6) 
In practice, University Y can make its own decisions concerning the new undergraduate 
programs to be opened even before the formal delegation of power.  
For ‘project 985’ universities like ours, it makes little difference whether or not 
the new undergraduate program needs to be approved by MOE. MOE seldom 
rejects our applications. But we do feel at ease with the formal delegation of 
power (UX-8).  
The strong negotiation ability of University Y with MOE enables it to make earlier and more 
active changes than University X. However, the increased autonomy is accompanied with 
increasing accountability for the quality of establishment and the quality of the new program. 
The quality of establishment can only be ensured if transparency and information flow exists. 
Therefore, formalization of decision-making procedures and standardization of roles are 
emphasized at University Y. The University also formulated decision-making procedure chart 
for Academic Committee, according to which the deliberation results must be publicized on 
its own website before they are forwarded to the president for final approval. The quality of 
the new program is evaluated every two years through internal quality assurance system, in 
which external experts are invited to be auditor rather than the government. However, the 
importance of quality and transparency is less apparent at University X, as there were little 
internal incentives for accountability under government-controlled program establishment 
(UX-5). Without autonomy, University X does not need to assume responsibility for the 
decisions taken. 
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5.3.2 Logic of behavior 
Actors’ logic of action affects the university’s adoption behavior of new practice. Here the 
analysis focus is on the administrators’ logic of action, as they are the one who are able to 
introduce changes in the university. To better understand their action, objective conditions, 
i.e. university culture must also be taken into consideration. 
In University X, administrative and academic powers have in practice been held by 
administrators. This is attested by the great degree of overlapping membership in the Standing 
Committee of CCP, the Councils of Presidents, Academic Committee and other committees. 
This concentration of powers emerged and prevailed in the centralized government steering 
era has led to the formation of interest groups who control all the resources (UX-1). For these 
interest groups, the alteration of power relation, for example, increased number and influence 
of pure professors in decision making at meetings of the Academic Committee would mean 
the loss of control over academic resources.  As administrators do not want to give up their 
vested interests, they “have been trying their best to postpone governance reform” (UX-3). 
This explains why changes that have been made so far fail to provide a clear separation of 
responsibilities between universities, faculties and Academic Committee. In the absence of 
clear regulations on the distributions of responsibilities among stakeholders, administrators 
are able to maintain their influence. 
In contrast with administrators’ resistance to power reallocation at University X, 
administrators at University Y is practical and open to change, and therefore administrators’ 
behavior in the intuitional work is primarily guided by the logic of appropriateness. This 
becomes apparent by examining the history of conscious selection by university leadership of 
various western models regarded as successful for restructuring organizational structure. 
When the University was restarted after national recovery from the ravages of the Cultural 
Revolution, there was no external force guiding its daily operation. The then-president of the 
University took every opportunity to implement core values and practices he believed as 
essential for university leadership and development after studying universities in the United 
States, Canada and Japan (UX-8). The mimetic behavior is further encouraged by the goal to 
become a WCU after 2010. The combination of increasing pressure to imitate and the increase 
in institutional autonomy enables the University to bring about innovations predated national 
university reforms. In spite of national policies, both respondents have emphasized the 
increasingly important role of international standards in their university governance reform. 
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Reference to these international models provided a definition for appropriate governance, that 
is, university governance without faculty participation will never leads to success. This 
perception of institutional governance was incorporated in the reform measures included in 
University Plan for Mid- and Long-term (2011-2020) Development. Administrator’s 
internalization of norms and values on university contributes to active withdrawal from the 
Academic Committee and employment of democratic selection of members. At the same time 
the Academic Committee Office has been set up so that the Academic Committee is not 
subordinated to administrative office. They also make continuing modification to Bylaws of 
the Academic Committee and other governing bodies to reduce inconsistence and ambiguity 
between regulations. 
Hence, as can be seen from the above comparison, administrators guided by the logic of 
consequence will be impeded from incorporating rationalized norms. They prefer to preserve 
the existing division of power. While administrators guided by the logic of appropriateness 
tend to actively promote changes in regulations and Academic Committee which cements the 
institutionalization of power redistribution. Thus, the combination of the degree of 
institutional autonomy and administrators’ logic of behavior can affect the university’s ability 
to create a formal decision-making structure that provides solutions to problems of 
bureaucratized management and its willingness to translated this formal structure into actual 
changes.  
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6 CONCLUSION 
The central focus of this research is on the division of power in the establishment of new 
undergraduate programs within Chinese universities. It examines changing power distribution 
in the approval process since 2010, using University X and Y as a multi-case study. The 
Chinese higher education system was characterized by a strong state and institutional 
leadership, and weak faculty members. When it comes to the establishment of new bachelor 
degree programs in China, administrative control played a substantial role. However, Chinese 
universities have been facing reforms of their governance structures which have also targeted 
the establishment of undergraduate degree programs. These reforms are advocating a division 
of power that would enable universities to enhance legitimacy of being an academic 
institution and improve the quality of higher education. In this respect, academics should get 
more control over substantive matters like the introduction of new undergraduate degree 
programs. This research sought out to explore how these reforms would impact the division of 
power in two different types of universities. 
6.1 Research question and answer 
The research question is how the power division is changing within Chinese universities 
regarding the introduction of new study programs at the bachelor level. To find out what 
would happen when administrators and academics meet in the establishment of undergraduate 
programs in the backdrop of a changing university governance structure, this research has 
focused on the establishment process at University X and University Y, both of which are 
research oriented institutions, however with differing degrees of institutional prestige. 
The findings show that changes in the power relation between academics and administrators 
in the establishment procedures differ greatly in the two universities. At University X, which 
is under the direct management of the provincial government that steers the institution 
according to its fiscal conditions, there is little actual increase of academics’ influence in the 
undergraduate program introduction as it was originally specified in the national policies. The 
discretionary authority remains with the administrators. The continuity of this power 
distribution is illustrated by the shallow level of institutionalizing the new role of academics 
in the establishment process. No regulatory changes have been developed to stabilize and 
legitimize the academics’ authority in the decision-making procedures, leaving room for 
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possible administrative intervention. Moreover, the failure to incorporate and internalize 
socialized norms within University X contributes to the continuing conflicts between 
administrators and academics in terms of the legitimate resources of authority in the program 
introduction. The result is that the Academic Committee, which is the only agency that 
involves faculty members in the reviewing process, is still dominated by administrative 
appointees. Thus, every stage of program establishment is under the control of administrators. 
Proposals for new undergraduate program are usually initiated from deans or the university 
leadership, and reviewed by different committees mainly composed of administrators. 
The implementation of the national reform policies at University X may be hindered by the 
lack of intuitional autonomy and university culture. As a provincial university, University X 
has no autonomy to introduce new undergraduate programs. The lack of adequate institutional 
autonomy constrains its ability to cultivate institutional identity and create a structure that can 
assure the inclusion of the faculty in academic decision making. The institutionalization of the 
new role of academics is further constrained by the reluctance of administrators to introduce 
changes that would reduce their control over resources, especially in the absence of internal 
incentives. Although University X is now modifying its governing documents and adjusting 
the composition and function of the Academic Committee, it is driven largely by coercive 
pressure (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). These changes are being made to demonstrate its 
compliance with national regulations. 
Empirical data from University Y suggests that there is a power shift from administrators to 
academics in the program establishment process. Being affiliated to the MOE and perceived 
as one of the best universities in China, University Y enjoys more informal autonomy than 
promised by national policies. The increased autonomy and the spirit of realism empower 
university leadership to break with the past and make conscious adoption and innovation of 
internationally rationalized norms for university governance. Therefore, the institutional 
changes at University Y are made under a mix of coercive, normative and mimetic pressures, 
with the latter two dominating (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). To effectively internalize these 
norms, the University enacted both a mid- and long-term Development Plan, and modified the 
bylaws of committees such as the Standing Committee of the CPC, the Council of Presidents, 
the Academic Committee and the Teaching Committee. This has led to an increasing 
formalization of decision-making procedures for undergraduate program introduction, and a 
positive change in the status and composition of the Academic Committee and the Teaching 
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Committee. It can therefore be said that in the case of University Y the policy initiatives have 
reached their goal of improving the academics’ control over the establishment of 
undergraduate programs, at least at Faculty B, where the Professor Committee has the final 
authority to approve the proposed undergraduate program.  
The comparison of the two universities suggests that the combination of institutional 
autonomy and the prevailing logic of appropriateness that guides administrators’ behavior can 
facilitate the institutionalization of a power shift from the executive structure to academic 
domains. The more prestigious the university is, the more autonomy it is likely to enjoy and 
the more present the sense of national and international competition that promotes the use of a 
logic of appropriateness in Chinese universities is. It could also be said that the university 
prestige is positively correlated with the level of institutionalizing power redistribution in 
introducing new undergraduate degree programs. This changing pattern could be expected in 
other public, research-oriented Chinese universities, due to the differentiated government 
steering and resource allocation. However, the extent of change in power distribution may 
vary across universities because of their historical development and provincial context. 
The gradual development of an academic domain in the governance structure of a Chinese 
university following NPM-inspired reforms (Mok & Lo, 2007) seems to indicate to some 
degree a converging development in the governance and management structure with modern 
European universities identified by Fumasoli et al. (2014), albeit the power is shifting from 
the executive structure to academic structure in Chinese universities, while in the European 
context it is shifting in the opposite direction. However, the different speed of 
institutionalization at the University X and the University Y also implies there may be 
differences in the content of the academic domain in the two cultures, especially when one 
takes into consideration the Confucian tradition which emphasizes the importance of state 
responsibility and moral governance, and a scholar’s responsibility in society and in relation 
to the state (see e.g. Hayhoe, 1999; Marginson, 2014; Zha, 2012). Although academic 
freedom is a universal value, the legitimacy of concrete practices of academic freedom may 
vary across cultures, which may lead to differences in the notions of academic duties and 
responsibilities. This also raises a question on how university autonomy and academic 
freedom derived from European traditions should be interpreted in other cultural 
environments. Therefore, in spite of the continuing modernization reforms that incorporated 
western norms on university governance, it remains to be seen how Chinese and European 
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universities will differ or converge in the content of academic domain under the impact of 
Confucian traditions. 
6.2 Suggestions for future research 
The intentional focus of this research is to study the division of academic and administrative 
power in the establishment of undergraduate programs more in-depth at University X and 
University Y through a case study. However, due to the problems encountered during the 
fieldwork, there is a lack of interviewees from the institutional level at University Y. The 
absence of data from institutional review agencies makes it impossible to investigate the 
informal decision-making process at the institutional level. Therefore, a follow-up research 
could be conducted to interview members of the Teaching Committee and the Council of 
Presidents. In doing so, it would be possible to evaluate the level of cultural-cognitive 
institutionalization and the share of influence of academics and administrators in the decision-
making process at University Y, and thus capture a true picture of formal and actual changes 
in the power relation between academics and administrators.  
Another limitation is the relatively short time frame of the study. Although the governance 
reforms focusing on de-bureaucratization in Chinese higher education started in 1998 with the 
promulgation of Higher Education Law, national policies for deep and comprehensive 
reforms were not issued until 2010. Thus the time frame is not long enough to study final 
changes in university governance, especially in universities where administrators are reluctant 
to implement reforms. As the implementation at university X is continuing, a follow-up 
research on the institutionalization of the power distribution can be conducted in order to 
investigate whether a modification of the rules made under coercive pressure will lead to 
actual changes in the power distribution in the introduction of undergraduate programs. 
Additionally, further faculties can be included to increase the transferability of findings and 
investigate whether disciplinary factors also influence the reform process.  
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Appendix 2: General Interview Guide 
1. What is your role in introducing new BA study programs at the faculty? How do you end 
up in that role? 
  
2. Where does the idea for introducing a new BA study program usually come from? The 
faculty? Or the university? Single professors? 
 
3. When your faculty decided to introduce a new BA study program, were there any other 
alternative programs considered? If yes, why finally introduced this one? Who made the 
decision? 
 
4. What are other actors and offices involved in the preparation at the faculty? What are their 
roles?  
 
5. It there is an academic body involved in this process, what is its size and composition?  
 
6. After the application is submitted to the university, which actors and organizations are 
involved in the decision-making process to introduce new BA study programs? What are 
their roles? 
 
7. Did you receive any comments during the one-month publicity online? If yes, how were 
they dealt with? By which actors? At which level? 
 
8. In your opinion, does the annual program evaluation have any impact on the influence of 
the academic authority in the whole process? If yes, in which ways? 
 
9. What are your reflections on the whole decision-making process? Is it good? Does it 
work? Why do you think is the case?  
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Appendix 3: Procedural Chart for the Review of New Undergraduate Programs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
